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SUMMARY 
Small business has a well-deserved reputation as the driver of job growth and 
as a key contributor to innovation. In the 12 years ending in 2013, small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) accounted for about 90% of private sector 
job growth in Canada. What is less well-recognized, however, is that a small 
fraction of SMEs account for most of the job growth and innovation. As a result, 
governments have offered broad-based support for small businesses, rather 
than focusing on high-impact entrepreneurs. This approach is wasteful: firms 
that do not grow or innovate receive most of the benefits. Further, this approach 
can harm economic performance by promoting the expansion of smaller, less-
efficient firms at the expense of larger ones. 
The federal government elected in 2015 is focussing new initiatives on innovative 
and growth-oriented businesses. Legislated reductions in the small business tax 
rate were reversed and targeted support for innovative SMEs was increased. 
While the change in direction is welcome, almost 85% of the $7 billion yearly 
funding for small business continues to provide broad-based support. 
The largest program is the special low rate of tax for small businesses, 
implemented to improve access to financing for capacity-expanding investment. 
This measure is harming economic performance because the cost of shifting 
capital and labour from large to smaller, less-efficient businesses outweighs the 
benefit from improving access to capital. 
Large subsidies for small business financing are also provided by the Business 
Development Bank of Canada (BDC). With access to cheap government funding, 
the BDC is profitable, but evaluated using a more realistic cost of financing, the 
bank operates at a substantial loss. This loss exceeds the benefit from improving 
access to capital, particularly for the bank’s direct-lending program. 
While there is a solid argument for supporting R&D, subsidies provided to 
small firms are so generous that they are harming economic performance. The 
federal government provides a 35% tax credit for R&D performed by small firms. 
Provincial tax credits raise the subsidy rate to about 42%. And those firms receiving 
support from the federal Industrial Research Assistance Program can have almost 60% 
of their project costs paid by the government. By way of contrast, large firms performing 
R&D receive subsidies from federal and provincial tax credits amounting to under a 
quarter of their costs, an intervention which improves economic performance. 
Canada has had what could be described as a small business policy – broad-based support 
for all small businesses. The newish federal government is moving to an entrepreneurship 
policy: new initiatives emphasize support for the high-impact firms and individuals 
that make an outsized contribution to Canada’s innovation and prosperity. Making the 
transition to the new framework will require overhauling legacy small business policies 
to free up resources for new initiatives and to secure fiscal savings. Three changes would 
pay big dividends:
• Eliminate the small-business corporate income tax deduction. 
• Reduce the enhanced R&D tax credit rate to the same level as the regular credit.
• Replace the BDC’s direct loan program with a loan guarantee program.
11. OVERVIEW
Federal and provincial governments have a substantial number of policies that support small 
and medium-sized enterprises and their owners. These measures are delivered through 
the tax system, through government business enterprises and through direct-spending 
programs. In the 2015–16 fiscal year, federal support targeted at non-agricultural small 
business and their owners amounted to almost $7 billion, or about 16 per cent of corporate 
income tax revenue. Policy is tilted towards broad support for small business rather than 
measures that support entrepreneurship. Since a very small number of firms are responsible 
for most employment creation and innovation, broad-based support for small business runs 
the risk of harming rather than helping economic performance by encouraging small-scale 
production. A more satisfactory policy framework would have a more nuanced approach to 
dealing with market failures and would favour the creation of a favourable environment for 
what has been described as “high-impact” entrepreneurship and, hence, innovation. 
This paper reviews the economic case for policies that support high-impact entrepreneurs 
(or innovative startups), assesses federal policies that support small businesses1 and their 
owners and makes recommendations to improve the effectiveness of these policies. 
Rationales
The economic case for providing targeted support for innovative startups is not clear-cut. 
For example, the nature of the market failure in the risk-capital2 market suggests over-
investment is a more likely outcome than underinvestment. A possible exception is the 
“seed” or “angel” capital segment, where underinvestment may be occurring as a result of 
risk-averse entrepreneurs. There is also a strong case for government intervention to correct 
a misalignment of incentives for investors and entrepreneurs that results in an inefficiently 
low level of advice being provided. The case for giving extra support for R&D undertaken 
by small firms is weak in a static environment, but is more plausible in a dynamic setting. 
Stronger rationales for targeted support arise from externalities associated with learning 
by doing, information and agglomeration or network effects. In addition, labour market 
imperfections, barriers to entry created by incumbents, and the unintended consequences 
of tax policy on entrepreneurs have clearly adverse effects on the entry and performance of 
innovative startups. 
Although empirical evidence is lacking, a reasonable conclusion would be that the number 
of innovative startups is inefficiently low given the set of externalities, market failures and 
policy-induced barriers they face. Acting directly on these issues is not always possible and, 
when it is, the cost of intervention can exceed the benefit. As a result, a bias to subsidizing 
entrepreneurial activity as a second-best policy may be appropriate. 
1 
Business size can be defined in terms of employment, assets, revenue or net income. Access to the largest small-business 
program — the small-business deduction — and many other federal programs, is restricted to firms that have less than $15 
million in assets or less than $500,000 in active business income. 
2 In this paper, the term “risk capital” refers to the seed and venture capital segments taken together. The seed or angel 
investment segment refers to the initial round of private outside financing while the venture capital segment refers to 
financing in later stages. Other analysts use the term “venture capital” as I use “risk capital.” Unless it causes confusion, I 
maintain the original usage when reviewing the literature. 
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Federal initiatives to support small business and entrepreneurship can be classified into 
three broad groups: financing programs, support for R&D, and tax measures that are 
particularly beneficial to entrepreneurs. To the extent possible, federal policy initiatives 
have been assessed in a formal cost-benefit framework. Given data limitations, the results 
should be considered illustrative rather than definitive.
Financing Programs
The small-business deduction provides a tax preference for all small firms that finance 
capacity-expanding investment with retained earnings. This measure is likely harming 
economic performance as the cost of encouraging small-scale production outweighs the 
benefit of improved access to capital for smaller firms. The small-business financing 
program, which provides guarantees for loans initiated by private sector lenders, is also 
harming economic performance, but on a much smaller scale. A key shortcoming of the 
program is that a substantial fraction of guaranteed loans would have been approved by 
private lenders. The social cost per dollar of loan guaranteed is about 1.5 cents.
The Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) is a government business enterprise 
that provides debt and equity financing as well as advice to small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). The BDC’s mandate is to provide services that are complementary to 
rather than competitive with private sector suppliers. The BDC makes an accounting profit 
based on a cost of capital of about one per cent.3 However, when its income is evaluated 
using the real social opportunity cost of capital, estimated at 6.25 per cent,4 the BDC makes 
a substantial loss on its operations. 
The BDC’s largest business line is a direct loan program (the “Financing Program”), which 
offers financing to SMEs with a higher risk profile than those financed by private lenders. 
The Financing Program portfolio is, however, substantially less risky than the small-
business-financing program portfolio. The rationale for a publicly funded direct-lending 
program is weak in general and there do not appear to be any special circumstances that 
strengthen the argument for the Financing Program. The net social cost per dollar of loan 
provided is about 4.5 cents. 
The BDC’s subordinate financing program targets firms that need financing to sustain 
growth. These investments are riskier than loans made under the Financing Program. The 
net social cost of the program represents about 0.5 cents per dollar of financing provided. 
The cost-benefit analysis does not capture the role that the subordinate financing program 
may be playing in providing financing for projects too risky for conventional debt but are 
unsuitable for venture capital financing because the expected return is too low. Getting 
these borrowers into the appropriate financing niche could be welfare-enhancing. 
The BDC also provides advice to entrepreneurs at below-market rates. This service could 
enhance welfare by convincing entrepreneurs to abandon low-quality projects, thereby 
3 Calculated as interest and dividends paid to the federal government divided by loans and share capital provided by the 
federal government. 
4 
This estimate is based on work by Jenkins and Kuo, adjusted to reflect recent developments in financial markets. See Box 5 
for a discussion.
3avoiding wasted resources. It could also help direct entrepreneurs to the appropriate 
financing vehicle. 
The BDC is an important player in the venture capital market, accounting for about 10 per 
cent of new investments on average over the last two years. The BDC makes venture capital 
investments directly at every stage of a technology-based company’s development and 
makes indirect investments via funds, some of which are led by private and other public 
sector funds. BDC Venture Capital recorded an accounting profit in 2015, its first since 
2001, and announced another profit in 2016. 
The BDC adopted a new strategic direction in 2011.5 A key element of this strategy is to 
use its influence to improve the quality of fund managers and to increase the size of venture 
capital funds in Canada. It is also moving away from direct investment in firms and more 
towards partnering with private funds in its venture capital operations. These are sensible 
objectives and the BDC’s substantial presence in the venture capital market can be used to 
help achieve them. For example, the BDC can select a small number of the most talented 
managers as partners and encourage them to increase the size of funds they manage. 
There are risks and transition costs resulting from the new strategy. There is no reason to 
suppose that the supply of venture capital is too low, so additional public supply will crowd 
out private investors. A negative impact on rates of return from increased supply appears 
unavoidable in the short-run as the industry restructures. Success of the strategy therefore 
depends in large measure on the BDC’s ability to select the best managers as partners who 
can become more efficient and survive the restructuring. 
Since there are reasons to suppose that the seed capital market is characterized by 
underinvestment, the BDC should continue its efforts to increase supply in this segment. 
While, in principle, direct investment should be avoided, the BDC has made a plausible 
infant-industry argument that would justify a period of continued direct investment. 
It was not possible to undertake a formal cost-benefit analysis of the BDC’s venture capital 
activities. Data availability is an issue, but assessing the benefits and costs of the new 
strategy is particularly challenging.
Export Development Canada (EDC) also provides venture capital and private equity 
investment to SMEs. In 2015, EDC reported a net gain of $50 million on the “fair value” of 
its venture capital and private equity portfolio. However, adjusted for the social opportunity 
cost of capital, there was a loss of about $20 million on the portfolio.
Support for R&D
The two largest programs supporting R&D by SMEs are the enhanced scientific research 
and experimental development (SR&ED) investment tax credit and the Industrial Research 
Assistance Program (IRAP). The enhanced SR&ED credit provides a 35-per-cent 
refundable tax credit on up to $3 million of R&D undertaken by SMEs. R&D undertaken 
by other firms is eligible for a 15-per-cent non-refundable credit. 
5 Business Development Bank of Canada, “Venture Capital Industry Review” (2011), http://www.bdc.ca/EN/Documents/
other/VC_Industry_Review_EN.pdf.
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average, in 2009 IRAP assistance accounted for 24 per cent of project costs. The assistance 
provided is generally in addition to the federal and provincial investment tax credits. IRAP 
provides financial assistance to firms through contribution agreements. The monitoring and 
reporting requirements of this type of funding are much more burdensome than for grants 
and tax credits. 
A cost-benefit analysis of the enhanced SR&ED tax credit and IRAP indicates that in 
both cases the net social benefit is negative. High compliance costs and, in the case of 
IRAP, high administration costs, are a factor in this outcome, but the key consideration 
is excessive subsidization. A firm claiming the federal and provincial SR&ED tax credits 
would, on average, receive a 42-per-cent subsidy and those firms receiving support from 
IRAP could have almost 60 per cent of their project costs paid by the government. In 
contrast, the average subsidy rate for a large firm benefiting from federal and provincial tax 
credits is about 23 per cent.
The case for providing extra support for R&D undertaken by small firms is weak. As 
suggested above, a premium could be justified by dynamic considerations or as a second-
best alternative to compensating for other externalities, but the subsidies now available still 
appear excessive.
Tax measures supporting entrepreneurship
The federal government has implemented a number of tax measures available to all SMEs 
but which are particularly beneficial to high-impact entrepreneurs because their income is 
more variable and has a substantial capital gain component. These measures comprise the 
lifetime capital gains exemption (LCGE), allowable business investment losses (ABILs), 
rollovers of investments in small-business shares and the employee stock-option deduction. 
Up to $800,000 in capital gains on the sale of qualifying shares in Canadian-controlled 
private corporations (CCPCs) is exempt from taxation over the taxpayer’s lifetime. There  
is no explicit size limit on the exemption, but most CCPCs have well under $10 million  
in assets. 
There is a solid case for exempting capital gains earned on the sale of assets used to 
generate active business income. An increase in the flow of net income generated by 
business assets will increase the market price of the assets. The price increase will equal 
the present value of the rise in the income stream generated by the asset. If the assets are 
sold, the income stream will be taxed twice: once as a capital gain and a second time when 
it is distributed as dividends. On the other hand, exempting capital gains will result in 
unintended revenue losses as taxpayers have an incentive to characterize other sources of 
income as capital gains. However, by restricting the exemption to SME shares, the LCGE 
appears to be a reasonable compromise between efficiency and protecting the tax base.
In most circumstances, capital losses can only be deducted from capital gains. This 
policy prevents taxpayers from deducting capital losses as they occur while deferring 
taxes on unrealized capital gains. While justifiable as a measure to protect the tax base, 
the asymmetric treatment of capital gains and losses may be particularly burdensome for 
owners of young firms, who may be more likely to have capital losses without offsetting 
5capital gains. The deduction for allowable business investment losses permits losses 
incurred on shares or debt issued by a small business to be deducted from ordinary income. 
This selective measure can be justified as an offset to the other barriers faced by startups. 
Tax on the capital gain realized from the disposition of small-business common shares 
can be deferred, provided that the proceeds are reinvested in another small business. This 
rollover provision extends the deferral of capital gains, thereby reducing the effective 
tax rate. Given that exemption of capital gains on small-business shares is sound policy, 
deferral of capital gains is an appropriate second-best policy for investors that have used up 
their LCGE.
The employee stock-option deduction provides an employment benefit equal to one-half of 
the difference between the cost to the employee and the fair market value of the stock at 
the time it was acquired. The deduction is available to all employees. The additional benefit 
for employees of CCPCs is the deferral of tax on the employment benefit until the stocks 
are sold. The cost of the stock option is not a deductible expense for firms, so there is a net 
subsidy only for firms subject to the lower small-business corporate income tax rate and for 
unprofitable firms. 
Recommendations
Financing Programs
1. Eliminate the small-business deduction.
2. Improve the incrementality of the Small Business Financing Program.
3. Restructure the BDC:
• Transform the Financing Program into a loan-guarantee program and integrate it with 
the Small Business Financing Program.
• Confine activity in the venture capital program to passive indirect investment, with 
the possible exception of the seed capital segment. 
• Subsidize private sector partners by offering leveraged returns. Cap the BDC’s return 
on the upside without any downside protection: 
 ◦ In the seed capital segment, the subsidy should be determined with the premium 
required by risk-averse investors in mind. 
 ◦ In the venture capital segment, the implicit subsidy should be determined by 
considering the size of the incentive required for venture capitalists to offer more 
advice to firms they support. 
 ◦ Continue with the strategy announced in 2011. When implementing the strategy, 
take a cautious approach to increasing the supply of venture capital in order to 
balance its long-run benefits and short-run costs.
4. Eliminate venture capital and private equity investment by Export Development 
Canada. Transfer the EDC portfolio to BDC to take advantage of scale economies in the 
delivery of programs and in executing the BDC’s strategy announced in 2011.
6Support for R&D
1. Reduce the federal enhanced SR&ED tax credit rate from 35 to 15 per cent. This would 
lower the combined federal-provincial rate to about 25 per cent, which is only slightly 
higher than the value that minimizes the static social loss associated with the enhanced 
SR&ED program. 
2. Limit “stacking” of federal and provincial assistance to 40 per cent of project costs. In 
conjunction with the first recommendation, this would effectively cap IRAP subsidies at 
20 per cent.
3. Apply SR&ED risk-management practices to IRAP funding in order to reduce 
administration and compliance costs. The combination of a detailed application and 
selective auditing of claimants appears to be sufficient to keep losses at acceptable 
levels in the SR&ED program. Similar results are likely to be achieved for IRAP 
clients.
Tax measures supporting entrepreneurship
1. Fine-tune the LCGE, ABILs and rollovers to improve the support they provide to high-
impact entrepreneurs (see text).
2. Implement general changes that make the tax treatment of variable income flows and 
capital gains more neutral:
• Allow income averaging.
• Extend the period for loss carry-backs and “index” the value of loss carry-forwards.
• Allow capital losses to be deducted from ordinary income after they have been 
applied to realized and unrealized capital gains. 
The standard tax treatment raises the effective tax rate on variable income streams and 
capital gains. The above changes would apply to all taxpayers, but entrepreneurs would 
benefit more since their income is more variable than employment income and has a large 
capital gain component. 
No estimates of the fiscal cost of the two recommendations in this section are available. The 
gross fiscal saving arising from other recommendations would be $4 billion. Changes to the 
enhanced SR&ED tax credit would increase revenue by about $725 million. Eliminating the 
small-business deduction would save $3.3 billion initially, but less over the longer run. The 
small-business deduction amounts to an interest-free loan to finance capacity-expanding 
investment that is partially recovered when small firms begin distributing the income 
earned on this investment. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
Canada, like a number of other countries, provides government support targeted at small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) or their owners. The key motivation for providing 
extra support for SMEs is that they are considered a major source of employment growth 
and innovation, leading to rising living standards. However, since a very small number of 
7firms are responsible for most employment creation and innovation, indiscriminate or broad-
based support for small business runs the risk of harming rather than helping economic 
performance by encouraging small-scale production.6 Growing awareness of this risk has 
prompted most policy analysts to recommend shifting from a “small-business” policy to a 
framework that involves a more nuanced approach to dealing with market failures and the 
creation of a favourable environment for entrepreneurship and, hence, innovation. 
Following Gentry and Hubbard,7 entrepreneurs can be defined as individuals that invest 
time and money in undertakings that generate uncertain returns. A subset of entrepreneurs 
provides the link between knowledge creation, or invention, and innovation, which is 
the act of bringing inventions and creative insights to market. These “high-impact” 
entrepreneurs8 raise the productive capacity of the economy, so society has an interest in 
encouraging their activity. Designing cost-effective policies to increase the rewards from 
high-impact entrepreneurship is a challenge, but there are substantial benefits from simply 
ensuring government policies are neutral with respect to risk-taking and to the choice 
between paid employment and entrepreneurship. 
Underlying the reluctance to endorse broad-based SME policies is the often implicit 
assumption that market imperfections affecting all small firms are not substantial enough 
to justify costly government intervention. In contrast, governments implementing such 
policies highlight the role of small business in job creation and innovation. The employment 
rationale is usually formulated in terms suggesting that supporting small business will raise 
the overall level of employment. However, since small-business policies do not affect the 
supply of labour, sustained support for small business can only shift employment from large 
to small firms. In a static analysis, such a shift would put downward pressure on overall 
income because productivity is lower in the small-business sector. In a dynamic setting, 
there could be an offsetting gain in real income if small firms are more innovative than 
larger firms, resulting in more transitions to large-firm status and more exits of incumbent 
large firms. This analysis highlights the risk of broad-based SME policies, since such 
policies subsidize many firms that do not intend to grow or innovate. 
Federal policies providing support for non-agricultural small business and entrepreneurship 
are delivered through the tax system, through the Business Development Bank of 
Canada (BDC) and to a lesser extent through direct-spending programs. Existing federal 
policy measures are tilted to broad support for small business. Despite emphasizing the 
importance of entrepreneurship and innovation in recent budgets, new policy initiatives 
have continued to focus on broad-based support for SMEs. The total cost of small-business 
and entrepreneurship programs was about $7 billion in fiscal 2015–16, which represents 
about 0.33 per cent of GDP and 16 per cent of corporate income tax revenues. 
6 
For a review of the literature on the characteristics of high-growth firms see Alex Coad et al., “High-Growth Firms: 
Introduction to the Special Section,” Industrial and Corporate Change 23, 1 (2014): 91–112.
7 
William M. Gentry and R. Glenn Hubbard, “Tax Policy and Entrepreneurial Entry,” The American Economic Review 90, 2 
(2000): 283–287.
8 See Magnus Henrekson and Mikael Stenkula, “Entrepreneurship and Public Policy,” in Handbook of Entrepreneurship 
Research (Springer, 2010), 595–637, http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4419-1191-9_21.
8This paper has three objectives. First, to provide an overview of the rationales for 
intervening to support high-impact or innovative entrepreneurship. Second, to describe and 
assess federal measures that support small business and entrepreneurship. Third, to make 
policy recommendations to improve the effectiveness of these policies. 
3. RATIONALES
Boadway and Tremblay9 present a comprehensive analysis of externalities, market failures 
and policy-induced barriers affecting innovative startups. Their analysis, supplemented 
somewhat by the author, is summarized in Table 1. Factors affecting innovative startups 
are classified into four categories: externalities, labour market imperfections, non-financial 
barriers and financial barriers. This section discusses the barriers listed in Table 1. Because 
financial barriers are particularly important for innovative entrepreneurship, particular 
attention is devoted to capital market failures. 
The economic case for providing targeted support for innovative startups is not completely 
cut and dried. Some factors provide a rationale for additional support for innovative 
startups; some factors affect all firms similarly, while others suggest small firms should 
instead be penalized relative to larger firms. Although evidence is lacking, a reasonable 
conclusion would be that the number of innovative startups is inefficiently low given the set 
of externalities, market failures and policy-induced barriers they face. Acting directly on 
these issues is not always possible and, when it is, the cost of intervention can exceed the 
benefit. As a result, a bias to subsidizing entrepreneurial activity as a second-best policy 
may be appropriate. 
Externalities 
Undertaking and commercializing R&D results in several externalities or spillovers, not 
all of which are positive. The knowledge created by R&D inevitably spills over to other 
firms and the price reductions that accompany cost-reducing process innovations increase 
the total value of consumer surplus, implying that an R&D subsidy is appropriate. On the 
other hand, innovators do not internalize the destruction of rents10 from existing products 
and technologies, so if first-mover advantages are large, competition could cause a wasteful 
dissipation of the rents available from innovation. Both of these effects weaken the case for 
a subsidy. 
Should the subsidy vary by size of firm? There is evidence that, compared to larger firms, 
small firms tend to undertake more R&D intended to develop new products and processes, 
with less of an emphasis on R&D intended to improve existing products and processes.11 
As a result, knowledge spillovers could be higher, but there may be an offsetting impact 
from greater rent destruction. High fixed costs may prevent small firms from using 
9 Robin Boadway and Jean-François Tremblay, “Public Economics and Start-up Entrepreneurs,” in Venture Capital, 
Entrepreneurship, and Public Policy, ed. Christian Keuschnigg and Vesa Kanniainen (MIT press, 2005),  
http://www.academia.edu/download/41844451/Venture_Capital_Entrepreneurship_and_Pub20160201-6136-1j0ac6.pdf.
10 These rents, which represent the ability to produce valued output with fewer resources, are valuable to society.
11 Statistics Canada, Science Statistics: Industrial Research and Development, 2005 to 2009, Statistics Canada catalogue no. 
88-001-X, 2009.
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complementary technologies, as intensively as larger firms do. Employee turnover may also 
be a more important source of knowledge spillovers from small firms. On the other hand, 
small firms are less likely to establish networks and linkages with universities and other 
firms,12 so spillovers could be smaller. 
Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen13 present evidence that spillovers rise with firm size. 
Their explanation for this finding is that smaller firms operate in technological “niches,” 
which limit the scope for knowledge spillovers. The sample consists of relatively large, 
publicly traded firms, so the results may or may not apply to SMEs. For example, the niche 
effect may be offset by the greater difficulties small firms have protecting their intellectual 
property. The niche effect is, however, substantial: spillovers associated with the smallest 
size category in their sample (less than 500 employees) are only 55 per cent as large as 
spillovers associated with the largest size category.
In contrast, most of the other externalities discussed by Boadway and Tremblay are 
likely to have unfavourable impacts on innovative startups, suggesting that subsidizing 
entrepreneurs would be appropriate. 
• To the extent that firms have vintage-specific cost structures, the gap between the 
private and social costs of learning by doing is greater for new firms than for existing 
firms. New firms benefit from the experience embodied in the technology available 
when they enter, but their entry decision is not affected by the benefits conferred on 
future entrants. 
• Entry also provides a signal about the profitability of products and processes that 
benefits other firms, causing entry to fall below the social optimum. 
• Finally, innovative startups may have less flexibility than larger firms about location 
decisions so it could be more difficult for them to take advantage of agglomeration or 
network economies.
The exception is the decision to introduce a new product, which has an ambiguous impact 
on innovative startups. Entry and product diversity could be too high because the loss of 
rents on existing products is not considered; but they could be too low because the social 
benefit from product diversity on consumer surplus is not part of the entry decision.
12 ibid.
13 Nicholas Bloom, Mark Schankerman, and John Van Reenen, “Identifying Technology Spillovers and Product Market 
Rivalry,” Econometrica 81, 4 (2013): 1347–1393.
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TABLE 1: RATIONALES FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION TO SUPPORT INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURS
Issue Description Impact Impact on  
Entrepreneurs1
Externalities
R&D / Process 
innovation
Knowledge spillovers  
Higher consumer surplus from lower costs 
Destruction of incumbents’ rents
 “Innovation contests” 
All firms underinvest  
All firms underinvest 
All firms overinvest; larger impact for startups
Dissipation of potential rents. Entry of new firms will 
occur too soon
Neutral 
Neutral 
Favourable 
Favourable
New products Destruction of rents and higher consumer surplus  
are ignored
High correlation of entry and new products means 
entrants affected most; but the impact of the offsetting 
influences is ambiguous
Ambiguous
Learning  
by doing
Experience raises productivity; some of this knowledge 
may spill over to other firms
New firms bear the cost but cannot appropriate all the 
benefits, so entry is too slow
Unfavourable
Information Entry provides a signal of profitability that benefits 
other firms 
New firms bear the cost but cannot appropriate all the 
benefits, so entry is too slow
Unfavourable
Agglomeration 
or network 
effects
Firms benefit from lower costs by co-locating Entrepreneurial startups may have less flexibility 
in location choice, so may get smaller benefit from 
agglomeration economies
Unfavourable
Labour market imperfections
Adverse 
selection
Cannot determine quality of workers ex ante, so all in 
the pool are offered the same rate
Marginal product of marginal employee exceeds wage 
rate; impact may be worse for firms hiring workers for 
the first time
Unfavourable
Search  
externalities
Employees and employers do not capture all of the 
benefits of their search efforts 
Startup may expend more effort searching and pay 
higher wages
Unfavourable
Non-financial barriers 
Incentive to 
innovate
Either entrants or incumbents may innovate too soon Entrants ignore existing rents; incumbents attempt to 
prevent entry Direction of bias depends on timing and 
disruptiveness of innovation 
Ambiguous
Entry  
deterrence by 
incumbents
Incumbents have an incentive to overinvest in capital, 
advertising and patenting 
Entry will be too low; Best policy response is to tax 
established firms
Unfavourable 
Tax policy Asymmetric treatment of profits and losses  
Asymmetric taxation of capital gains and losses
Calendar-year taxation with progressive rates
Profit-insensitive taxes — payroll, property taxes 
Compliance costs
Loss-making startups will pay a higher effective tax rate 
Discourages risk-taking  
Higher effective tax rate on “lumpy” returns
Loss-making startups will be at a disadvantage 
Fixed costs put startups at a disadvantage
Unfavourable 
 
Unfavourable 
Unfavourable 
Unfavourable
Financial market failures 
Adverse 
selection
Quality of projects/entrepreneurs difficult to determine 
ex ante
Risk-neutral agents: overinvestment in innovative 
projects most likely outcome 
Risk-averse entrepreneurs: underinvestment in startups
Favourable 
 
Unfavourable
Moral  
hazard
Acting in self-interest undermines efficiency Entrepreneurs undersupply effort and capitalists 
undersupply advice
Unfavourable
1. The contents of this column are meant to indicate whether policy should encourage, discourage or be neutral relative 
to entrepreneurship. In many cases, the first-best policy is to correct the market failure or act on other market 
participants rather than directly subsidizing or taxing entrepreneurial effort.  
Labour market imperfections 
Labour market imperfections are also likely to have a more severe effect on innovative 
startups. Adverse-selection issues arise in labour markets serving innovative industries 
because it is particularly difficult to assess the quality of workers, so all workers in a given 
category are offered the same wage. In a competitive equilibrium, the average marginal 
product of workers will equal the wage rate determined elsewhere in the economy where 
adverse selection is not an issue. Since the marginal worker in the hiring pool will have a 
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higher marginal product than the wage rate, hiring will be inefficiently low. This pooling 
equilibrium is expected to be more problematic for startups since they are hiring workers 
for the first time. 
The process of matching workers with vacancies will not in general be efficient because of 
search externalities.14 In models inspired by Diamond, employers and employees brought 
together through a search process negotiate a wage. Search effort by a given employee 
increases the probability of filling vacancies, but makes it harder for other workers to find 
employment. Similarly, posting a vacancy increases the probability of workers finding a 
match, but makes it harder for other firms to fill vacancies. In the case of posting a vacancy, 
an efficient outcome requires that the negotiated wage rate equals the social marginal 
product of the worker. Only in special circumstances will the negotiated wage rate equal 
the marginal product of the worker plus the social costs incurred as a result of adding to the 
pool of vacancies.
Startups may have a less effective search process than established firms. If so, startups will 
have a lower probability of finding and keeping a well-matched worker. In addition, startups 
are likely to have a weaker bargaining position, so there would be upward pressure on the 
negotiated wage rate. 
The existence of adverse selection and search externalities in labour markets suggests that 
wage subsidies for startup entrepreneurs could be welfare-improving. 
Non-financial barriers
Either entrants or incumbents may innovate more rapidly than is socially efficient. Entrants 
do not consider the destruction of rents on existing products when they make the decision 
to enter with a new product or process. On the other hand, incumbents have an incentive 
to innovate to prevent entry. Incumbents will be willing to sacrifice the rents available on 
existing products and technologies as long as the expected profits exceed those available 
after introduction of a competing product or technology. 
Whether entrants or incumbents are favoured depends on the nature of innovation. 
For example, if innovations cannot easily be anticipated by incumbents and are highly 
disruptive, innovation by entrants could exceed the socially efficient pace. In this case, 
penalizing startups would be the appropriate policy.
Incumbents have an incentive to overinvest in capital, advertising and patenting to deter 
entry of competitors. In principle, these incentives could be dulled by taxing investment 
and advertising by existing firms, but designing relatively efficient taxes that primarily 
affect existing firms would be a challenge. There may be more scope for changing patent 
regulations to make patents less susceptible to use as an unwarranted entry barrier. A 
second-best approach is to implement policies that favour innovative startups without acting 
on a market failure.
A number of tax policy measures have unintended impacts on entrepreneurship. In most tax 
systems, asymmetric treatment of corporate profits and losses raises the effective tax rate 
14 
Peter A. Diamond, “Wage Determination and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium,” The Review of Economic Studies 49, no. 2 
(1982): 217–227.
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on startups. Existing firms are able to deduct from other revenue streams losses incurred 
during the introduction of a new product or technology. Startups incurring losses can only 
carry them forward for deduction against future profits. Since the losses carried forward are 
held constant in nominal terms, startups will, on average, face a higher effective tax rate on 
innovation than will existing, diversified firms. Increasing the value of deductions by the 
cost of borrowing by small firms would be an appropriate policy response.
Capital gains and losses are not treated symmetrically in most tax systems, which 
discourages risk-taking. Capital gains are taxed upon realization, but capital losses can only 
be deducted against capital gains. Investment in projects with a greater variance in rates 
of return will therefore face a higher effective tax rate than will investment in less-risky 
projects. An appropriate policy response would be to allow capital losses to be deducted 
from other income, provided that they exceed unrealized capital gains. This will only result 
in full loss-offsetting if the entrepreneur has enough income from other sources to offset 
the loss. In the absence of refundability, carry-backs and “indexing” capital losses would 
improve efficiency. 
Gentry and Hubbard15 make the point that since a progressive income tax reduces the return 
to success, it should discourage entry by risk-neutral individuals into entrepreneurship, 
which is characterized by highly variable outcomes. The combination of calendar-year 
taxation and progressive tax rates can discourage entry even for entrepreneurs that 
experience average returns but that vary substantially from year to year. For example, if 
returns to a project are meagre or non-existent for several years followed by a large payout, 
the effective tax rate on the return will be higher than if it were spread out evenly over the 
same number of years. Allowing income averaging could therefore improve welfare by 
removing a disincentive to entrepreneurship. 
The use of profit-insensitive taxes, such as payroll and property taxes will put startups at a 
disadvantage since they typically have low profits or losses. Exemptions for startups would 
be an appropriate policy response. 
Finally, since there is a substantial fixed-cost component to tax compliance, small firms will 
in general suffer a disadvantage relative to larger firms.
Capital market imperfections
There is general recognition in the literature that information asymmetries leading to 
adverse selection and moral hazard result in less-than-perfect capital markets. There is 
also a consensus that the problems created by asymmetric information are more severe 
for young, knowledge-intensive firms. First-time entrepreneurs, by definition, do not have 
a track record that will help secure financing, and if the proposed project is difficult to 
understand, the impact of asymmetric information becomes much larger. There is, however, 
less of a consensus on the implications of the market failure for firm financing and the 
appropriate role for government. 
15 
Gentry and Hubbard, “Tax Policy.”
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Adverse selection with risk-neutral agents and no monitoring costs
Two early and equally plausible models come to opposite conclusions on the impact of 
adverse selection on capital markets. Stiglitz and Weiss16 conclude that there is too little 
investment because adverse selection raises the cost of funds for marginal investments. In 
contrast, de Meza and Webb17 show that there could be too much investment in the sense 
that projects with an expected return below the opportunity cost of capital could be funded 
because they will be cross-subsidized by high-yielding projects. 
As explained in Boadway and Tremblay,18 these conflicting results arise from different 
assumptions about lender knowledge of returns conditional on success (R) and the 
probability of success (p). Both Stiglitz-Weiss and de Meza-Webb assume that there is a 
one-to-one relationship between R and p: as p increases, R falls. As a result, there is a 
unique value p* that determines the marginal project that will be funded. De Meza and 
Webb assume lenders know R, but cannot distinguish between projects by probability of 
success. As result, when lenders set a minimum required value of R to obtain funding, 
they are effectively offering financing to all projects with p ≥ p*. The average probability 
of success of projects funded, pa, is greater than p*, which implies that some of the projects 
have returns below the cost of capital, indicating overinvestment. Lenders fund too many 
low-p, high-R projects. In Stiglitz-Weiss, lenders are able to differentiate projects by 
their expected returns (pR), but for a given expected return cannot separate projects by 
probability of success. When lenders offer to finance all projects with a minimum expected 
return, they are effectively offering financing to projects with p ≤ p*, assuming pR falls as p 
increases. In this case, pa ≤ p*, indicating underinvestment. In other words, lenders will not 
offer financing for some high-p, low-R projects that have returns above the cost of capital. 
Boadway and Keen19 develop a generalized version of the Stiglitz-Weiss and de Meza-
Webb models by allowing projects to take on varying combinations of p and R. The debt-
financing case is illustrated in Chart 1, adapted from Boadway and Keen. 
The curved lines illustrate projects with combinations of p and R such that either private 
costs and benefits or social costs and benefits are equal. The slope of the social “zero net 
benefit” curve is steeper than the slope of the private “zero profit” curve indicating that the 
increase in R required to compensate entrepreneurs for a reduced probability of success 
is less than the increase required to cover all social costs. This difference arises because 
entrepreneurs only pay interest if they are successful, but the social cost of financing is 
independent of the project outcome. 
Projects in areas A and B (or more precisely some portions of these areas) are handled 
efficiently: projects that should be undertaken, are (area A), and projects that should not 
be undertaken, are not (area B). Areas C and D are characterized by overinvestment and 
underinvestment respectively. Overinvestment occurs in high-risk (low p), high-conditional-
16 Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss, “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,” The American Economic 
Review 71, 3 (1981): 393–410.
17 David de Meza and David C. Webb, “Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information,” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 102, 2 (1987): 281–292.
18 Boadway and Tremblay, “‘Public Economics.’”
19 Robin Boadway and Michael Keen, “Financing and Taxing New Firms under Asymmetric Information,” FinanzArchiv: 
Public Finance Analysis 62, 4 (2006): 471–502.
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return projects, while underinvestment occurs in lower-risk, lower-conditional-return 
projects. The net impact cannot be determined a priori. 
If only equity financing is available, the Boadway-Keen model predicts that adverse 
selection results in excessive investment, both when projects are pooled or separated by 
rate of return. When both debt and equity financing are available, the model predicts 
overinvestment if projects are pooled, but the results are ambiguous in the presence of 
return-specific contracts.
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Chart 1: Financing Under Adverse Selection 
The General Case With Debt Financing 
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Risk-averse entrepreneurs
The Boadway and Keen model, and the other models in this literature, assumes that outside 
investors and entrepreneurs are both risk-neutral. This assumption is worth reconsidering 
because most entrepreneurs in small innovative firms are not able to hold a diversified 
portfolio of assets. Most of their wealth is invested in their firm, so entrepreneurs may 
adopt risk-averse rather than risk-neutral behaviour. 
Braido, da Costa and Dahlby20 amend the Boadway and Keen model to allow for risk-
averse entrepreneurs. The authors first establish that with risk-averse, wealth-constrained 
entrepreneurs having access to debt and equity financing, along with project pooling by 
outside investors, the Boadway-Keen conclusion of excessive investment no longer holds. 
They do not investigate outcomes with return-specific contracts. Similar to the Boadway-
Keen result for debt financing, there is a distorted mix of investments and the total volume 
20 Luis HB Braido, Carlos E. da Costa, and Bev Dahlby, “Adverse Selection and Risk Aversion in Capital Markets,” 
FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis 67, 4 (2011): 303–326.
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of investment may be higher or lower than what would occur in an efficient capital market. 
The authors explain this finding by noting that there are two market failures at work. As a 
result of adverse selection, some low-risk projects with negative social benefits are financed 
while, as a result of risk-averse entrepreneurs, some high-risk projects with positive social 
benefits are not undertaken. In a second step, Braido, da Costa and Dahlby use numerical 
analysis to demonstrate that, with plausible assumptions about the degree of risk aversion 
by entrepreneurs, the net impact of the two market failures is too little investment in 
entrepreneurial projects. 
The investment decision of a risk-averse entrepreneur is illustrated in Chart 2, developed 
by Dahlby.21 The entrepreneur requires a premium over the risk-free rate, r, to finance the 
project out of his or her wealth (W). (Note that the premium rises along with the share of 
the entrepreneur’s wealth invested in the project.) With risk aversion, the amount invested 
by the entrepreneur is below the socially optimal level K*, which is also the level that 
would be chosen by a risk-neutral entrepreneur. If the entrepreneur could share the risk 
with outside investors, the amount invested in the project would also be K*. The inability 
to benefit from risk sharing may reflect high fixed costs of financial intermediation or the 
existence of asymmetric information problems.
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Boadway and Sato22 examine inefficiencies in financing when lenders incur costs to assess 
the probability of success of projects and use the results to set interest rates on loans. The 
authors assume that entrepreneurs can switch lenders after receiving a loan offer and that 
lenders engage in Bertrand competition for loans using interest rates. Two types of loan are 
21 
Bev Dahlby, “The Optimal R&D Subsidy for Risk Averse Firms” (2011).
22 
Robin Boadway and Motohiro Sato, “Information Acquisition and Government Interventon in Credit Markets,” Journal of 
Public Economic Theory 1, 3 (1999): 283–308.
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considered, high quality and lower quality. In this setting, only entrepreneurs with lower-
quality projects will have an incentive to switch lenders. To retain these entrepreneurs, 
lenders offer a pooled interest rate on loans rather than a rate that reflects their risk profile. 
As a result, ex ante evaluation costs will be recovered through higher interest rates on 
good-quality loans, pushing them above their efficient levels. An efficient equilibrium 
would require that lenders incur economic losses. Further, the evaluation effort may be 
higher than the efficient level. Lenders experience a net gain by incurring monitoring costs 
to reduce errors in classifying projects. Assuming that it is easier to identify high-quality 
than low-quality projects, error correction will consist of shifting projects from higher to 
lower categories. As a result, borrowers with lower-quality projects experience a loss as 
they pay higher interest rates on their loans. The private gain to the lenders will exceed the 
social gain, which is the sum of the lenders’ gains and the borrowers’ losses, so lenders 
have an incentive to allocate too many resources to an ex ante assessment of project quality.
Dietz,23 and Keuschnigg and Nielsen,24 analyze adverse selection in models of equity 
financing that explicitly include advice provided by venture capitalists. In Dietz, 
entrepreneurs with knowledge of the quality of their projects actively seek higher-cost 
venture capital financing for high-risk (low-p), high-return (high-R) projects, because 
they expect the advice provided will raise their net return by increasing the probability of 
success. Assuming that advice has a larger impact on higher-risk projects than on lower-
risk projects, venture capitalists will also want to finance high-risk, high-return projects. 
High risk and the cost of providing advice drive the cost of venture capital finance well 
above that of “pure” (no-advice) equity financing, so entrepreneurs with projects that have 
a probability of success above a certain threshold do not have an incentive to seek venture 
financing. In principle, this could result in an efficient outcome, but if competition among 
venture capitalists reduces the cost of venture financing, the standard adverse-selection 
problem arises. Some entrepreneurs with low-risk projects will have an incentive to switch 
from pure equity financing to venture equity financing because they will perceive a net 
benefit from higher-cost financing accompanied by some advice. These lower-risk projects 
will not be profitable for venture capitalists. In the absence of screening, risky projects will 
pay too much for venture financing and less risky projects will pay too little. 
Keuschnigg and Nielsen obtain the same result, although they start with the assumption that 
neither the entrepreneur nor the venture capitalist knows the probability of success until a 
formal relationship is set up. Venture capitalists are assumed not to screen applicants and 
some entrepreneurs are too optimistic about the quality of their projects, which gives rise to 
the classic adverse-selection problem. 
Dietz highlights the fact that venture capitalists have an incentive to incur screening 
costs to eliminate the low-risk projects that cannot be profitably financed. This does 
not necessarily improve efficiency in Dietz’s framework: some low-risk projects that 
23 Martin D. Dietz, “Risk, Self Selection and Advice: Banks versus Venture Capitalists” (2002), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=302080.
24 Christian Keuschnigg and Soren Bo Nielsen, “Self-Selection and Advice in Venture Capital Finance” (2007), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=963319.
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would benefit from advice do not receive any.25 In a subsequent analysis, Dietz26 assumes 
that project quality is revealed to the entrepreneur at the screening stage. All refused 
applications are assumed to be correctly identified as low-quality projects. If rejected 
projects are dropped rather than financed by pure equity or bank loans, venture capital 
screening generates a social benefit by eliminating wasteful projects. Venture capitalists 
invest in screening until the marginal cost of screening equals the marginal benefit from 
raising the quality of projects financed. Venture capitalists bear all of the costs of screening 
but do not capture the benefit of avoiding wasteful spending by entrepreneurs on poor-
quality projects. The investment in screening is therefore inefficiently low. 
If screened-out projects are unsuitable for venture financing, but profitable when financed 
by pure equity or conventional debt, underinvestment in screening does not necessarily 
occur. Kanniainen and Leppämäki27 develop a model in which venture capitalists are able 
to classify entrepreneurs by talent or quality and offer financing for all entrepreneurs above 
a minimum talent level. Entrepreneurs screened out by venture capitalists are assumed to 
be of higher quality than the average entrepreneur seeking debt. An increase in screening 
effort by venture capitalists could therefore cause some entrepreneurs to switch from equity 
to debt (or pure equity) financing, which would enhance efficiency by increasing profits of 
both venture capitalists and banks. On the other hand, in a zero-profit equilibrium, the cost 
of debt finance will fall; this encourages entry of less-qualified entrepreneurs, which means 
the net impact on efficiency could be positive or negative. This result seems to depend on 
the cost of debt finance being at or below its optimal level in the absence of screening by 
venture capitalists. A plausible case can be made that self-selection of projects into venture 
finance from bank finance puts upward pressure on the cost of debt finance.
Moral hazard
The above analyzes focus on adverse selection. Moral hazard can also be an issue, 
particularly for equity financing. Investors wanting to protect their investment against 
hidden actions by entrepreneurs will structure contracts to align incentives of both parties 
and take an active role in managing the business. As pointed out by Elitzur and Gavious,28 
there is a “double” moral-hazard problem in equity finance because both the entrepreneur 
and the venture capitalist contribute to the success of the project, but neither receives the 
full value of their contribution. As a result, the amount of business-management services 
(advice) provided by venture capitalists is likely to be inefficiently low. 
Moral hazard will also diminish the use of riskpooling by investors. If entrepreneurs are 
more risk-averse than investors, equity contracts can fulfill a risk-pooling function that will 
allow investors to bear some of the risk.29 But if outcomes are affected by the unobservable 
25 
Note that the optimal amount of advice that should be provided declines as projects become less risky.
26 Martin D. Dietz, “Screening and Advising by a Venture Capitalist with a Time Constraint” (CFS Working Paper, 2003), 
https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/25406.
27 Vesa Kanniainen and Mikko Leppämäki, “Financial Institutions and the Allocation of Talent” (2002), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020547.
28 
Ramy Elitzur and Arieh Gavious, “Contracting, Signaling, and Moral Hazard: A Model of Entrepreneurs, ‘Angels,’ and 
Venture Capitalists,” Journal of Business Venturing 18, 6 (2003): 709–725.
29 Boadway and Tremblay, “Public Economics.”
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effort of entrepreneurs, the incentive to provide risk-pooling services declines. However, as 
demonstrated in Dewatripont, Legros and Matthews,30 the sequential use of convertible debt 
and equity can circumvent this trade-off. 
Implications for government intervention
Boadway and Keen caution that it would not be appropriate to draw strong policy 
conclusions from their analysis of adverse selection, noting that it is tempting to 
conclude that the best response may be for governments not to intervene. However, since 
governments do intervene, the focus in this section is on exploring the circumstances 
in which government support for financing entrepreneurial projects is most likely to be 
welfare-enhancing.
Loan guarantees
The Boadway-Sato finding of inefficiently high monitoring effort and interest rates, 
even with risk-neutral agents, points to a role for government. One policy response is 
for governments to compensate lenders for losses incurred on projects that fail. A loan-
guarantee program reduces the incentive for lenders to undertake ex ante loan assessments, 
which will also reduce the interest rate charged on better-quality projects. On the other 
hand, a loan guarantee reduces the interest rate charged on lower-quality loans below its 
efficient level, so if the portion of the loan guaranteed is too high, economic efficiency 
could be harmed rather than helped. 
If entrepreneurs are risk-averse, a loan-guarantee program could be welfare-enhancing 
even in the absence of ex ante quality-assessment costs by lenders. In Chart 1, which 
assumes zero monitoring costs, a loan guarantee would shift down the zero-profit line 
for entrepreneurs. While this would reduce or eliminate the underinvestment shown in 
area D, it would expand overinvestment in area C and could create an additional area of 
overinvestment below area D. This would make overinvestment a more likely outcome. 
With risk-averse entrepreneurs, the zero-profit line would be higher, which would reduce 
the size of the overinvestment in area C and this would in turn make it less likely that a 
loan-guarantee program would cause a net increase in overinvestment.
The Stiglitz-Weiss31 analysis referred to earlier provides a simpler rationale for loan-
guarantee programs. In their model, lenders maximize the return on their loan portfolio 
by lending to lower-risk borrowers. While loan volumes could increase by raising the 
interest rate to attract more borrowers, the additional loans will be higher risk than the 
loan-portfolio average. As a result, the expected return on the additional loans will be lower 
than the portfolio average. In this model, higher-risk borrowers are refused credit instead 
of being offered loans at higher interest rates or with less-favourable conditions. A loan-
guarantee program could mitigate the resulting market failure. 
30 Mathias Dewatripont, Patrick Legros, and Steven A. Matthews, “Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics,” Journal 
of the European Economic Association 1, 4 (2003): 890–930.
31 Stiglitz and Weiss, “Credit Rationing.”
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Survey evidence suggests this Stiglitz-Weiss framework has some relevance for policy, 
despite its focus on a single interest rate. R. A. Malatest and Associates32 presented loan 
applications from participants in the small-business financing program to a sample of 
lenders and asked how the application would have been processed in their institution. There 
were three choices: accepted; accepted with less-favourable conditions, such as additional 
collateral or a lower loan amount; and rejected. One-quarter of loans would have been 
accepted, 30 per cent would have been conditionally accepted, and 45 per cent would have 
been rejected by the respondents’ institutions. Lenders appear to engage in credit rationing, 
although some loans are priced to risk. 
A second policy response to dealing with costly information acquisition is for governments 
to lend directly to entrepreneurs. A government-supported bank could promote efficiency 
by pricing loans to risk and treating the fixed costs of ex ante assessments as a non-
recoverable cost. The potential improvement in efficiency may not be realized if the public 
sector bank is not as good at assessing risk as are private sector banks. This is a concern 
since the public bank has less of an incentive to maximize profits. An offsetting advantage 
of direct lending is that loans provided by a public bank that has invested in ex ante 
evaluation provide a signal about project quality to private sector lenders, which improves 
access to credit. Overall, direct involvement by governments in financial markets carries 
risks that can be avoided by implementing a loan-guarantee program.
Free advice
The analysis of adverse selection in equity finance by Dietz33 suggests that venture capital 
screening could be too high or too low. However, in either case, government provision 
of advice to entrepreneurs could be sensible policy. If projects screened out by venture 
capitalists can be profitably financed by other means, a limited amount of free advice would 
raise the probability of success of these projects, which could be welfare-enhancing. If 
projects screened out by venture capitalists would not be profitable when financed by other 
means, the provision of free advice could convince some entrepreneurs to avoid wasteful 
expenditures on unprofitable projects. In the Keuschnigg-Nielsen model, providing free 
advice would allow entrepreneurs to obtain a more realistic assessment of their projects, 
which would also reduce the number of welfare-reducing applications for venture financing. 
Support for seed financing
There is a solid argument for providing government support to entrepreneurs seeking seed 
finance. Such entrepreneurs are likely to be more risk averse and have less collateral than 
entrepreneurs seeking additional financing for an ongoing enterprise. In addition, to the 
extent that angel investors spend more time with each entrepreneur than venture capitalists 
do, the scope for risk pooling may be more limited than for venture capital. The seed or 
angel investment market is small relative to the venture capital segment, suggesting that 
government intervention would be small-scale. The visible component of the angel capital 
market represented 13 per cent of the venture capital segment in 2015 (Box 1). 
32 R. A. Malatest and Associates Ltd., “CSBFP Lender Awareness and Satisfaction Study,” 2014, https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/
csbfp-pfpec.nsf/eng/la03244.html.
33 Dietz, “Risk”; and Dietz, “Screening.”
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Box 1 : Relative size of the seed or angel investment market
The visible angel investment segment is small relative to the venture finance component of the risk capital market. 
Individuals and groups registered with the National Angel Capital Organization (NACO) financed 283 companies 
for a total investment of $130 million in 2015.1 In contrast, there were 536 venture capital deals worth a total of 
$2,259 million in the same year.2 However, $154 million in venture capital financing in 178 deals was classified as 
seed financing. The angel/seed market was therefore about $285 million in 2015, involving about 460 deals and 
representing about 13 per cent of the value of venture capital financing. It is unlikely that all angel investors are 
registered with the NACO, but the visible component would have to represent only five to seven per cent of the total 
for angel investment to be roughly comparable to venture capital investment.
1. National Angel Capital Organization (2015) 2014 Report on Angel Investing Activity in Canada June.
2. Canadian Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (2015) 2014 Canadian Venture Capital Market 
Overview http://www.cvca.ca/research-resources/industry-statistics/
As can be seen from Chart 2, there is a social benefit from subsidizing investment at a 
rate roughly equal to the risk premium required for the entrepreneur to accept outside 
financing.34 What form should the assistance take? Given the nature of the market failure, 
policies to reduce the risk aversion of entrepreneurs and to enhance risk pooling by angel 
investors should be considered first. Changing bankruptcy laws to make them more 
favourable to debtors would make entrepreneurs less risk averse, although some of the gain 
would be lost since investors would be likely to raise their required return to compensate 
for higher losses when projects fail. If entrepreneurs are more risk averse than investors, 
however, tilting bankruptcy policy more in favour of debtors should result in a net increase 
in the number of projects financed. 
In principle, governments could subsidize either entrepreneurs or angel investors to get 
the market for seed capital to clear. Governments are unlikely to have the specialized 
knowledge required to act as angel investors, so subsidizing entrepreneurs through the 
direct provision of seed capital is fraught with risk. A subsidy could be provided indirectly 
by implementing a preferential capital gains regime for entrepreneurs, which would raise 
the expected after-tax return, although it would be very difficult to target such a measure at 
innovative startups. 
The “side-car” investment approach now used in the venture capital segment could be 
used to subsidize the supply of seed capital. In this approach, the government would 
passively invest in angel investors, capping its upside return but accepting loss of all the 
capital invested. Angel investors would select projects to finance without input from the 
government participant. This investment model raises the expected return to the private 
investors, which will increase supply. Some of the increase in expected return will be 
passed on to entrepreneurs, prompting more of them to accept financing offers. This 
approach also reduces the importance of the moral-hazard market failure identified above 
by raising the return to effort (providing advice) by angel investors: less of the extra return 
generated by their effort will be shared with the entrepreneur. 
34 More formally, the optimal subsidy rate in the absence of costs of delivering assistance is the proportion of the marginal 
return on the investment that accrues to the rest of society. If the entrepreneur’s required rate of return is ρ and the social 
opportunity cost of capital is r, the optimal subsidy rate is (ρ – r)/(1 +ρ). See Dahlby, “The Optimal” for a complete 
derivation. This formulation does not include the costs associated with providing the subsidy.
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On the other hand, with governments sharing proportionately in losses but less than 
proportionately in the gains, angel investors would have an incentive to undertake riskier 
projects, which could reduce efficiency. Another disadvantage of this approach is the 
large number of angel investors or syndicates of investors with whom the government 
would partner. While dealing with angel investors would be cheaper and less fraught with 
risk than directly investing in entrepreneurs, the extra costs should be considered when 
assessing the benefits and costs of intervention. 
The government should set up a contract with angel investors so that the expected value 
of the subsidy is closely related to the risk premium required by entrepreneurs. While it 
will not be possible to develop precise estimates of the risk premium, some illustrative 
calculations could be performed to put a cap on the subsidy. For example, if a risk-
neutral entrepreneur requires a 15-per-cent return on investment, a five-percentage-point 
risk premium suggests that the subsidy should be just over four per cent of the amount 
invested. The subsidy would have to be increased to reflect the fact that, with an upward 
sloping supply curve for angel investment, not all of the subsidy will be passed through to 
entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, this estimate of the optimal subsidy would remain much lower 
than proposed by some other analysts (Box 2).
Box 2 : The “optimal” capital market subsidy
It is sometimes suggested (for example by Brander, Hellman and Egan1) that government intervention in the venture 
capital market is justified by the spillovers from the policy-induced increase in R&D and innovation. This point of 
view is inconsistent with the standard advice to act directly on market failures where possible. If existing subsidies 
for performing R&D are optimal in the sense that they maximize the net benefit from supporting R&D, an additional 
subsidy can only provide a net benefit if it is addressing a market failure other than knowledge spillovers. Further,  
as discussed below, evaluations of R&D support programs indicate that subsidies for R&D undertaken by small firms 
are above their optimal level, so an excessive capital market subsidy would increase the net loss arising from the  
R&D subsidy.
1. Brander, James, Edward Egan and Thomas Hellman, “Government Sponsored versus Private Venture Capital: 
Canadian Evidence,” in International Differences in Entrepreneurship, ed. Josh Lerner and Antoinette Schoar 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), Chapter 9, http://www.nber.org/books/lern08-2.
Another way to increase the supply of seed capital is to give angel investors a subsidy for 
each dollar they invest. The subsidy should be set at the same rate as for the “side-car” 
investment fund. While such a subsidy would increase the supply of seed capital and the 
same percentage of the subsidy would flow through to entrepreneurs, the incentive effects 
would be quite different. The subsidy would be a fixed percentage of the amount invested 
so there would not be any incentive to increase the amount of advice provided, nor would 
angel investors increase the risk profile of their investments. In addition, the cost of 
administering a subsidy could be less than for a side-car fund, particularly if the subsidy is 
delivered through the tax system.
Venture capital financing — encouraging the provision of advice
The theoretical analysis of venture capital finance indicates that intervention in this 
segment of the risk capital market should be focused on improving the incentives for 
venture capitalists to provide advice. “Side-car” funding by the government that gives 
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private investors leveraged returns appears to be an appropriate policy response. As 
discussed above, such investment provides an incentive to provide additional advice since 
it increases the venture capitalists’ share of the value added from advice. Since there is no 
evidence to support the view that the supply of venture capital is too low, government side-
car funding should displace or crowd out private venture capital. But complete crowding out 
is not an equilibrium response because the expected private sector rate of return will rise as 
a result of government participation. Private supply will increase to reduce returns to their 
pre-policy, competitive levels. The new equilibrium will show a small increase in overall 
supply and unchanged returns for venture capitalists with the government subsidy being 
used by venture capitalists to pay for additional advice. 
The cap on the government’s return could be adjusted to achieve the desired subsidy rate. 
In contrast to the seed capital investment, the optimal size of the subsidy rate is not known, 
even in the abstract. An alternative would be to cap the government return so that its 
expected return would be equal to either its cost of borrowing or the social opportunity cost 
of capital. 
It is worth emphasizing that the theoretical analysis suggests that adverse selection results 
in overinvestment in the venture capital segment. Rates of return will be lower than they 
would be with symmetric information, but they should be equal to the return available in 
competing asset classes after allowance for higher risk. Additional government supply will 
inevitably drive down rates of return and crowd out private investors. (If fund managers 
were obtaining super-normal returns, additional supply would reduce returns but private 
investors would not necessarily exit.) Fund managers benefiting from a subsidy, such as 
the tax credit for labour-sponsored venture capital corporations, may be less sensitive to a 
decline in rates of return, so the impact on rates of return could be substantial. 
Summary of policy implications
In summary, theoretical analysis suggests the following conclusions about government 
intervention in capital markets:
• While adverse selection may affect all markets, the problems are likely only severe 
enough to justify intervention for innovative projects.
• Loan-guarantee programs should support the less-risky innovative projects that can 
be financed by debt. Such projects require an above-average level of screening by 
lenders but are not suitable for venture capital financing because outside advice would 
not appreciably affect their probability of success. 
• Governments should provide basic advice to entrepreneurs at below-market prices. 
This could enhance welfare by preventing entrepreneurs from wasting resources 
on low-quality projects or by raising the probability of success of projects that are 
too risky for debt or pure equity financing but not risky enough to warrant venture 
financing.
• Risk aversion likely results in too little investment by startup entrepreneurs. Policies 
to reduce risk aversion and facilitate risk pooling and measures to increase the supply 
of seed capital could be welfare-enhancing.
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• Adverse selection likely results in too much investment in the venture capital 
segment. Moral hazard results in the under-provision of advice by venture capitalists, 
so policies that raise the incentive to provide advice without increasing the supply of 
venture capital are likely to be welfare-improving. 
• Direct provision of credit by governments should be avoided. Intervention designed 
to correct distorted market signals is likely to be as good as or superior to direct 
provision of credit.
4. RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Federal government programs that support small business and entrepreneurship are 
presented in Table 2. These programs are delivered through the tax system, through 
direct-spending programs and through two government business enterprises, the Business 
Development Bank of Canada (BDC) and Export Development Canada (EDC). Official 
sources indicate that these programs have a total cost of about $5.5 billion; however, the cost 
of programs delivered by the BDC is understated. The adjusted cost of support programs is 
almost $7 billion, which represents about 0.33 per cent of GDP and 16 per cent of corporate 
income tax revenues. On the other hand, the cost of the largest program—the special low 
rate of income tax for small corporations—is overstated by an unknown amount.
Tax measures, excluding refundable tax credits, account for about 60 per cent of the support 
provided to small business. The BDC adjusted cost accounts for another 18 per cent of the 
total, leaving about 22 per cent for direct-spending programs. Programs are tilted almost 
five to one in favour of small-business policy (i.e., they are available to all small businesses). 
4.1 Financing programs
The small-business deduction 
The stated objective of the federal small-business deduction is to “provide small 
corporations with more after-tax income for reinvestment and expansion.”35 The special 
low rate of income tax is available on up to $500,000 of active business income earned by 
Canadian-controlled private corporations (CCPCs). The benefit is reduced to zero as assets 
increase from $10 to $15 million. The federal small-business rate was 11 per cent from 2008 
to 2016; the general rate was reduced from 19.5 per cent in 2008 to 15 per cent in 2012. 
The four-percentage-point small-business preference resulted in a maximum tax reduction 
of $20,000. The 2015 budget announced that the small-business rate would be reduced 
by two percentage points by 2019, but with a change in government in 2015, only the first 
0.5-percentage-point reduction in January 2016 was allowed to stand. The fiscal cost of the 
small-business deduction was $3.3 billion in 2015.
35 Finance Canada, Tax Expenditures: Notes to the Estimates/Projections (2010), 75, http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2010/
taxexp1004-eng.asp.
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TABLE 2  FEDERAL TAX AND SPENDING PROGRAMS THAT SUPPORT SMALL BUSINESS AND  
ENTREPRENEURSHIP1 2015-162
Policy Description
Type of  
Support
Cost ($ Million)
Reported Adjusted3
Financing Programs
Small Business Deduction Low rate of income tax on up to $500,000 of active business 
income; reduced to zero as assets rise from $10 to $15 m. 
SB 3,250.0 3,250.0 
Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) Financing--direct provision of non-investment grade loans SB -441.8 1,133.5 
Subordinate financing--direct supply of higher risk instruments E -53.7 4.3 
Venture capital program E -70.7 18.1 
Consulting -- below-cost provision of business advice E 31.6 31.6 
Securitization--promote asset-based financing by small fincos SB -3.1 36.6 
Total BDC -537.7 1,224.1 
Small Business Financing  
(Loan guarantee program)
Government pays 85% of loan losses, capped at about 12% of value 
of portfolio. Fees cover about 70% of program costs.
SB 62.7 10.0 
Export Development Canada Venture capital and private equity investment E -50.0 20.0 
Labour-sponsored venture capital  
corporations (LSVCCs) tax credit
15% tax credit on up to $5,000 investment in LSVCCs. E 90.0 90.0 
Subtotal Financing Programs 2,865.0 4,594.1 
Support for R&D and innovation
Enhanced SR&ED Investment Tax Credit Higher refundable tax credit for R&D small firms (35% vs.15%) E 1,265.0 722.9 
Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP) Subsidies and free advice for firms undertaking R&D. E 168.5 168.5 
Subsidies for organizations providing services to firms E 13.1 13.1 
IRAP Youth Employment Strategy Subsidies for firms hiring highly-skilled youth E 23.7 23.7 
Incubator and Accelerator Program Services to support early-stage firms and entrepreneurs (closed) E 18.2 18.2 
Business Innovation Access Program Business services and technical assistance from educational and 
research institutions.
E 11.5 11.5 
Subtotal: Support for R&D and Innovation 1,500.0 957.9 
Support for Entrepreneurship
Lifetime Capital Gains Exemption Up to $800,000 capital gains tax exemption on disposition of 
shares in Canadian-controlled private corporations.
SB 775.0 775.0 
Deduction of Allowable Business  
Investment Losses
Capital losses deductible from ordinary income when they exceed 
realized capital gains.
E 55.0 55.0 
Rollover of investments Sales of small business shares do not trigger a capital gain if the 
proceeds are re-invested in another small business
E 2.0 2.0 
Employee Stock Option Deduction Only half of the employee benefit is included in income. Available 
to all employees.
E N.A. N.A. 
Spending programs supporting entrepreneurship Futurpreneur, Women’s Enterprise Initiative E 10.8 10.8 
Subtotal: support for entrepreneurship   832.0 832.0 
Other programs targeted at small business
Hiring Tax Credit for small business Reduction in employment insurance premiums SB 305.0 305.0 
Business Development Program (Atlantic Canada 
Opportunities Agency)
Subsidies for startup, expansion or modernization of SMEs SB 133.1 133.1 
Subtotal other programs 438.1 438.1 
Total Support 5,635.1 6,822.1 
Percent of total support
Entrepreneurship 26.7% 17.4%
Small business 73.3% 82.6%
1. Excluding agriculture and fishing. 2. 2015 for tax measures and the BDC. 3. See text for explanation. 
Legend: SB Small Business; E Entrepreneurship
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The reported cost of the small-business deduction is overstated. The deduction reduces 
taxes on retained earnings used for business expansion, but the taxes paid on these 
retained earnings when they are eventually distributed are not deducted from the cost 
estimate. When a firm reaches its target size so that investment equals depreciation of its 
capital stock, income earned on its capital that is distributed as dividends will be taxed 
at approximately the same rate as dividends from a large firm when both personal and 
corporate income taxes are considered. Further, small firms that grow into large businesses 
pay the large-firm income tax rate on the income generated by all of their capital, so 
governments will eventually recover the benefit in this case as well. In this context, the 
small-business deduction is more like an interest-free loan to finance investment than an 
outright subsidy, which suggests that the net cost is likely to be substantially less than the 
gross fiscal cost.
Box 3: What determines the net fiscal cost of the small-business deduction?
The intention of the small-business deduction appears to be to provide an interest-free loan to undertake capacity 
expanding investment with retained earnings. For a given target size of firm, the cost of this loan will rise with the 
discount rate used (the opportunity cost of public funds) and with the share of investment financed by retained 
earnings. The net cost moves in the opposite direction as the rate of return on assets because, as the rate of return 
rises, it will take less time to reach the firm’s target size and the loan will be repaid more quickly. A plausible high-
cost scenario for surviving firms can be developed by making the following assumptions:
• The rate of return on assets is five per cent, approximately equal to the average rate of return on small-
business assets. 
• The firm uses all profits to finance a doubling of its assets over 15 years.
• The real discount rate is 6.25 per cent, as discussed in Box 5.
• The firm stops expanding after 15 years and distributes all net income via dividends. 
With these assumptions, the net present value of benefits is 42 per cent of the gross amount claimed. Few surviving 
firms are likely to receive a benefit that is substantially higher than this, although the net fiscal cost of the deduction 
will be 100 per cent for firms that claim it but fail before paying dividends. In a low-cost scenario (10-per-cent rate of 
return on assets, 50 per cent of expansion financed with retained earnings and a five-per-cent discount rate) a firm 
with the same growth objective would receive a net benefit of 22 per cent of the SBD benefits received over nine 
years and repaid over the following three years.
Firms that invest retained earnings passively and distribute accumulated retained earnings via a share buyback can 
obtain a larger net benefit. For example, if in the high cost scenario described above, the firm passively invests net 
income earned from year 16 to 31 and distributes accumulated retained earnings through a share buyback in year 32, 
the present value of benefits is approximately 90 per cent of gross amount claimed. Not many firms would be able 
to achieve this result.
On the other hand, although retained earnings that are invested passively are subject 
to a special tax, this does not eliminate the tax advantage from passive investment of 
retained earnings because the tax is refundable. In addition, retained earnings can be 
distributed as a capital gain through share buy-backs, in which case the effective tax 
rate on distributions from a small business would be lower than on distributions from 
a large business. Nevertheless, it would be unusual for firm to retain the full benefit of 
the small business deduction even when taking full advantage of these two tax planning 
opportunities. (Box 3.) As a result, it is safe to concluded that the reported cost of the 
small business deduction exceeds its true cost, but there is not enough information 
available to determine how much the cost is overstated.
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An illustrative cost-benefit analysis of the small-business deduction
The small-business deduction allows firms to finance more of their investment through 
retained earnings. A static cost-benefit analysis of the small-business deduction is presented 
in Table 3. In this example, adapted from Dachis and Lester,36 it is assumed that the small-
business tax reduction is financed by an increase in the tax rate on other firms, which is 
a natural financing source to consider since it leaves the overall tax burden on business 
investment unchanged. The analysis assumes that small firms pay a five-percentage-point 
risk premium on the cost of debt finance and that their debt-asset ratio is 0.3, compared to 
0.5 for larger firms. In 2015, the federal small-business tax advantage was four percentage 
points, which reduces the user cost of capital by about one per cent. Because of the 
ambiguity about the net amount of tax revenue forgone, costs and benefits are expressed per 
dollar of tax revenue forgone.
The social benefit from correcting the capital market failure is assumed to equal the 
reduction in marginal production costs arising from the tax reduction. Using a simple 
version of the Harberger Triangle formula, this benefit is estimated to be 0.4 per cent of the 
tax revenue forgone (Box 4). 
The decrease in the relative income tax rate in the small-business sector causes a 
reallocation of capital and labour from the large- to the small-business sector. There will 
be a social benefit from the tax reduction on small business and a social cost from the 
increase in tax on other business investment. The social cost will exceed the social benefit 
for two reasons. First, large firms are more efficient than small firms. Second, a higher tax 
rate on large firms leads to profit shifting out of Canada by multinationals and a loss of tax 
revenue, which adds to the social cost of taxing large firms. 
There are two studies demonstrating that efficiency increases with firm size in Canada. Lee 
and Tang37 compare total factor productivity (TFP) in Canadian and U.S. manufacturing 
over the 1985–95 period and find that larger firms are about 15-per-cent more productive 
than firms with less than 100 employees. Leung, Meh and Terajima38 analyze TFP by firm 
size for all Canadian industries over the 1984–97 period. In their study, TFP in firms with 
more than 100 employees is 8.4-per-cent higher than in other firms over the entire period 
and 5.1-per-cent higher over the last five years of the sample.39 
Tax-base shifting has substantial impacts on corporate tax revenue. In a meta-analysis 
of existing empirical work on international profit shifting, Heckemeyer and Overesch40 
develop a “consensus” prediction that a one-percentage-point reduction in the corporate 
36 
Benjamin Dachis and John Lester, “Small Business Preferences as a Barrier to Growth: Not So Tall after All,” C.D. Howe 
Institute Commentary 426 (2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2609527.
37 
Frank C. Lee and Jianmin Tang, “Multifactor Productivity Disparity between Canadian and US Manufacturing Firms,” 
Journal of Productivity Analysis (2001): 115–128.
38 
Danny Leung, Césaire Meh, and Yaz Terajima, “Firm Size and Productivity,” Bank of Canada Working Paper (2008), http://
www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/53956.
39 
These estimates relate to average productivity; the impact of marginal changes in the size distribution of firms may be 
smaller.
40 
Jost Heckemeyer and Michael Overesch, “Multinationals’ Profit Response to Tax Differentials: Effect Size and Shifting 
Channels,” ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper 13-045 (2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2303679.
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income tax rate increases reported profits of multinationals by 0.8 per cent.41, 42 Given a 
statutory tax rate of 26.7 per cent, a semi-elasticity of 0.8 implies that the direct revenue 
loss arising from applying a lower statutory tax rate to the profits of multinationals 
should be grossed up by 21 per cent to account for tax-planning effects.43 Assuming that 
multinationals account for 85 per cent of large-firm profits in Canada, the gross-up factor is 
about 18 per cent.
I capture the impact of TFP differentials and tax-base shifting by adjusting the marginal 
excess burden (MEB) of taxation for large and small firms. The MEB of taxation measures 
the loss in economic efficiency per dollar of tax revenue raised. Analysis by Baylor and 
Beauséjour44 implies that the social cost of raising an extra dollar in corporate income tax 
revenue is approximately 37 cents in Canada. Dahlby45 develops an estimate of 1.45 for the 
marginal cost of public funds, which under certain circumstances equals the MEB plus one. 
The average value of the MEB from these two studies is 0.41. 
Assuming that TFP is 8.4-per-cent higher in large firms than in small firms and that the 
gross-up factor for tax planning is 18 per cent, the MEB for income taxes on large business 
is 27.9-per-cent (1.084 x 1.18) larger than the MEB for small businesses. With the additional 
assumption that the overall MEB is a capital-stock-weighted sum46 of the individual MEBs, 
this relationship implies that the MEBs for small and large businesses are 0.328 and 0.422 
respectively. As a result, a decrease in the small-business tax rate financed by an increase in 
the large-business tax rate lowers real income by approximately 9.5 cents per dollar of tax 
revenue forgone. The benefit of mitigating the capital market failure reduces the net social 
cost to about nine cents per dollar of tax revenue forgone (Table 3). Using the estimated net 
fiscal cost of the small-business deduction shown in Table 2, the annual social cost of the 
measure would be about $100 million. Assuming the program continues indefinitely, the 
present value of this annual cost would be about $1.2 billion.
41 This is lower than the average semi-elasticity of 1.55 in the literature surveyed because the meta-analysis gives more weight 
to studies that use micro-data, improved econometric techniques and more recent data sets.
42 Dharmapala accepts the consensus estimate but notes that the most recent studies obtain even lower semi-elasticities, likely 
due to the ability to control for unobserved foreign-affiliate effects along with the now-standard controls for country and 
industry effects. See Dhammika Dharmapala, “What Do We Know about Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review of the 
Empirical Literature” (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2398285.
43 
The loss in tax revenue from profit shifting is calculated as ΔtˑγˑTBˑt and the direct tax-revenue loss is given by ΔtˑTB, 
where t is the tax rate, γ is the tax-base semi-elasticity and TB is the tax base. The overall revenue loss is therefore ΔtˑTB ˑ(1 
+ λˑ t), which amounts to a 21-per-cent gross-up when t=0.267.
44 
Max Baylor and Louis Beauséjour, “Taxation and Economic Efficiency: Results from a Canadian CGE Model” (Department 
of Finance, 2004), http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/finance/working_papers-ef/2004/10/wp2004-10e.pdf.
45 
Bev Dahlby, “Reforming the Tax Mix in Canada,” University of Calgary School of Public Policy Research Paper 5, 14 
(April 2012), https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/bev-dahlby-012-3.pdf. 
46 Firms claiming the small-business deduction accounted for 13 per cent of total investment over the 2000–11 period (Finance 
Canada, Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2013, 66). It is assumed that the capital stock share also averaged 13 per cent.
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TABLE 3  ILLUSTRATIVE STATIC BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF THE SMALL BUSINESS DEDUCTION 
(PERCENTAGE OF THE NET FISCAL COST OF THE PROGRAM)
Social Benefits
Mitigate capital market failure 0.4
Tax reduction for small business 32.8
Subtotal -- Benefits 33.2
Social Costs
Tax increase on large business -42.2
Net social benefit -9.0
Other costs not quantified
Increased tax evasion
Higher administration and compliance
Threshold effects on investment
This estimate understates the social cost of the small-business tax preference because it 
excludes tax-compliance issues. There is considerable evidence that the self-employed 
are less inclined to comply with the tax code. Schuetze47 reports an estimate that the self-
employed in Canada under-reported income by 18 per cent in 1990. The self-employed 
are broadly defined to include owners of unincorporated and incorporated businesses, and 
the under-reporting rate may not be the same for both categories of the self-employed. 
Nevertheless, subsidizing entry into small business is highly likely to result in additional 
tax evasion and this additional revenue loss has to be financed by higher taxes or lower 
spending, both of which will harm economic performance. A second, less-important 
missing cost is higher administration and compliance costs arising from a separate small-
business rate. 
47 
Herb J. Schuetze, “Profiles of Tax Non-Compliance among the Self-Employed in Canada: 1969 to 1992,” Canadian Public 
Policy (2002): 219–238.
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Box 4: The social benefit from correcting a market failure
The social benefit arising from correcting the assumed capital market failure equals the increase in real income 
resulting from the improved allocation of resources. The increase in real income is approximated by the increase 
in producer surplus from the reallocation. This increase is expressed relative to the amount of tax revenue forgone 
(TRF) in the following equation.
     
∆𝐸𝐸
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
=
−.5 ∙ 𝑠𝑠 ∙ 𝜉𝜉 ∙ Δ𝐼𝐼
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=
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In the above equation, ΔE is the efficiency gain from mitigating the capital market failure, TRF is the tax revenue 
forgone, s is the percentage reduction in the user cost of capital (1.0 per cent), ξ is the percentage of the subsidy 
that gets passed through to the user cost of capital (0.831), ε is the elasticity of investment with respect to its user 
cost (-1), I is investment, μ is the reciprocal of the semi-elasticity of the user cost (UC) with respect to changes in 
the statutory rate of income tax (4), δ is the economic depreciation rate of capital, K, and α is the share of capital 
financed by equity. 
The amount of tax revenue forgone equals the percentage-point change in the statutory rate (s times μ) that 
reduces the user cost by s multiplied by an estimate of shareholder income.2 Using values for overall business-sector 
investment and capital stock, the second term on the right-hand side of the equation had a value of 0.6 on average 
from 2010 to 2014.
1. The pass-through percentage is based on an elasticity of demand of -1 and an elasticity of supply of five.
2. The pre-tax return to equity, UC-δ, is calculated from data in Statistics Canada, “Financial and Taxation Statistics 
for Enterprises,” CANSIM Table 180-0003. Its average value from 2010 to 2014 is 12.1 per cent.
The possibility that a two-tier rate could affect firm size by raising the cost of capital 
as firms grow is often raised as a further cost of a preferential small-business tax rate. 
However, as discussed in Dachis and Lester,48 in most cases the benefits from growth will 
exceed the cost of losing the small-business tax preference, so most firms will jump over 
the barrier. Benefits from growth include scale-related cost reductions, improved access to 
financing, and a larger presence in the marketplace, which gives firms more pricing power. 
These benefits tend to rise, albeit not indefinitely, as a percentage of firm size, while the 
increase in the cost of capital arising from losing the small-business tax preference is a 
constant percentage of capital investment. As a result, firms with a target size that is well 
above their size when the thresholds for access to the tax preference begin to bind, will 
conclude that the benefits from growth exceed the cost of losing the special low rate of 
income tax. On the other hand, firms with a target size that is only slightly above their size 
when the thresholds begin to bind are likely to conclude that the benefits from growth are 
less than the cost of losing the tax preference. This decision will show up in clustering at 
the thresholds, but based on the evidence presented by Dachis and Lester, the social cost of 
the forgone scale-related cost reductions will be small relative to the tax revenue forgone. 
Policy recommendations 
The small-business deduction may be providing a social benefit by mitigating a capital 
market failure affecting all small businesses, but by encouraging less-efficient small-scale 
production it is imposing a net social cost on the economy. It should be eliminated. The 
48 Dachis and Lester, “Small Business.” Note that the analysis captures the impact of federal and provincial preferential tax 
rates for small business. 
30
fiscal savings will equal the reported tax revenue forgone initially, but will decline over 
time as tax revenue from the “recovery” of the deduction falls. 
The small-business financing program
The small-business financing program (SBFP) is another generally available measure. 
Under this program, the federal government guarantees loans originating in the private 
sector. In order to participate in the program, lenders must offer variable-rate loans at 
no more than three percentage points above the prime rate for business loans, and fixed-
rate loans at no more than three points higher than the rate for a single-family residential 
mortgage. These rates include a 1.25-per-cent annual administration fee paid to the 
federal government. Lenders also collect a two-per-cent registration fee on behalf of the 
government. The government pays 85 per cent of losses on defaulted loans, but for large 
lenders, total default claims cannot exceed approximately 12 per cent of the value of the 
loan portfolio (it was 10 per cent until 2009).49 In the fiscal year ending March 2015, the 
cost of the SBFP recorded in the public accounts was $63 million; net of fees collected, the 
cost was $10 million.
In fiscal 2015, the total value of new loans registered with the federal government was 
$785 million, trending down from about $1 billion in 2011.50 Loans were concentrated in 
the accommodation and food services sector (37 per cent) and retail trade (14 per cent) in 
2014. Borrowers are predominantly young and small firms: in fiscal 2015, 60 per cent of 
participating firms were less than a year old and about 40 per cent had less than $500,000 
in annual turnover. The number of loans guaranteed in fiscal 2015 was 5,067, which was 
just under half the number registered in 2005. Lender dissatisfaction with profitability 
and the administrative effort required to register loans and process claims appears to have 
decreased the use of the program.51 Limits on the size of loans may also have been an issue, 
but they were increased in 2014. The 2015 federal budget increased the loan amount and 
maximum term for investment in real property and raised the size-eligibility criterion for 
participation in the program. 
As discussed above, the expected impact of a loan-guarantee program depends on the 
nature of the market for small-business loans. If lenders price loans to risk and incur costs 
through ex ante assessments of loans, they may not be able to recover all of these costs 
on higher-risk loans, so they will raise the interest rate on higher-quality loans. Higher-
risk borrowers can take the loan offer to a competitor who can provide a lower interest 
rate because the competitor does not have to incur the assessment costs. A loan-guarantee 
program could reduce the amount spent on assessments, which would lower the interest 
rate on higher-quality loans. On the other hand, reducing the market interest rate on higher-
risk loans harms rather than helps efficiency, so the net impact is ambiguous. In contrast, 
if lenders engage in credit rationing, a program that only provides guarantees to borrowers 
that have been rejected by private lenders will generate a net social benefit. 
49 Program parameters are described in Canada Small Business Financing Act—Annual Report 2014–15, https://www.ic.gc.ca/
eic/site/csbfp-pfpec.nsf/eng/h_la03257.html.
50 The source for the data in this paragraph is Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, “Annual data since 
April 1, 1999,” https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/csbfp-pfpec.nsf/eng/h_la00039.html.
51 Canada. Department of Innovation, Science and Economic Development, Evaluation of the Canada Small Business 
Financing Program (2014), 15, https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ae-ve.nsf/eng/h_03711.html.
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I have undertaken an illustrative cost-benefit analysis of the SBFP assuming that lenders 
engage in credit rationing, as suggested by survey evidence cited earlier. With this 
assumption, the social benefit from reducing credit rationing can be approximated by 
calculating the producer surplus on the additional loans resulting from the loan-guarantee 
program. The additional producer surplus is approximately equal to the additional return on 
investments financed with a guarantee, relative to the return on investments financed with 
loans from the general pool. By assumption, the increase in the rate of return on projects 
financed with a guaranteed loan equals the reduction in the loan rate made possible by the 
loan guarantee. 
The subsidy resulting from the loan guarantee can be calculated by considering the 
value of the loan guarantee, net of the annual fee, and how this net benefit is likely to be 
shared between borrowers and lenders. From 2000 to 2009, losses on SBFP-registered 
loans averaged 9.65 per cent of the value of loans issued in each year.52 If this default rate 
continued to apply after 2009 for all lenders, they would have been able to claim 85 per 
cent of their loan losses, worth 8.2 per cent of loans issued. Since lenders are required to 
deduct the 1.25-per-cent annual fee from the interest received from the borrower, the net 
benefit to the lender is 6.95 per cent. In a competitive loan market, this benefit would be 
shared between borrowers and lenders, with the share depending on the relative size of 
the demand and supply elasticities for loans. Assuming that supply is two times as elastic 
as (the absolute value) of demand, two-thirds of the benefit would be passed through to 
borrowers,53 and the implicit interest-rate reduction for borrowers participating in the 
guarantee program would be 4.65 percentage points.
The incrementality of the SBFP is assessed on a periodic basis, using both survey and 
econometric analysis. The most recent survey of lenders54 was discussed above. Seens and 
Song55 develop a credit-scoring model similar to those used by banks. The model provides 
a satisfactory prediction of bank approvals of applications for conventional loans.56 When 
the model is applied to SBFP participants in 2011, it predicts that 67 per cent of participants 
would have been refused a conventional loan compared to 45 per cent in the Malatest 
survey. The average of the two estimates, 0.56, is used in the cost-benefit analysis.
The value of outstanding loans in fiscal 2015 is estimated at $4.2 billion.57 With an 
incrementality ratio of 0.56, the SBFP resulted in $2.4 billion in loans that would not have 
52 Canada’s ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development provides data on claims by year of loan issue. The 
default rate was calculated in two steps. First, the present value of claims paid over the term of loans issued in a given year 
was divided by the value of loans issued in that year. Second, a weighted-average rate was calculated for the 2000–09 
period and then divided by 0.85 to obtain the overall default rate. A discount rate of five per cent was used to calculate the 
present value of claims. The loan and claims data can be accessed at: https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/csbfp-pfpec.nsf/eng/h_
la00039.html (Tables 10a, 10b and 10c).
53 
The formula used to determine the pass-through percentage is η/(η-ε), where η is the elasticity of loan supply and ε is the 
elasticity of loan demand. See Box 4.
54 R. A. Malatest and Associates Ltd., “CSBFP Lender.”
55 Daniel Seens and May Song, “Requantifying the Rate of Incrementality for the Canada Small Business Financing Program” 
(2015), https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/061.nsf/vwapj/RRI_CSBFP-NQTA_PFPEC_eng.pdf/$file/RRI_CSBFP-NQTA_
PFPEC_eng.pdf.3,19]]}}}],”schema”:”https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”} 
56 
The count R-squared, which is defined as the number of correct predictions as a proportion of the total number of 
observations, is 0.71. 
57 Borrowers pay a 1.25-per-cent fee on the outstanding loan balance each year. In 2015, fee revenue was $52.670 million, so 
the value of outstanding loans was $52.670 / 0.0125 = $4,213.6 million. 
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been made without the guarantee. The social benefit (the producer surplus) from these 
additional loans is approximately $55 million (0.56 x 4214 x 0.0465 x 0.5 = $54.9 million).
TABLE 4  ILLUSTRATIVE BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF THE CANADA SMALL BUSINESS FINANCING PROGRAM 
(IN MILLIONS OF $)
Social Benefits
Mitigate capital market failure 54.9
Social Costs
Administration expenses -3.2
Financing cost -62.8
Total social cost -66.0
Net social benefit -11.1
Program costs consist of administration expenses and the cost of financing the net cost of the 
program. Administration expenses were $3.2 million in 2014.58 The present value of claims 
on loans outstanding in 2015 would be about $350 million (0.082 x $4.214 billion), while 
the present value of fees owed is estimated at $190 million. The expected net fiscal cost in 
2015 is therefore estimated to be about $160 million. Assuming a marginal excess burden 
of taxation of 0.4, the social cost of financing the program was approximately $65 million. 
With the above assumptions and calculations, the net social cost of the program was about 
$11 million in 2015. Benefits and costs of the program would be roughly evenly balanced if 
67 per cent of loans guaranteed under SBFP would have been refused by lenders. 
Policy recommendations
The SBFP may be acting on a capital market failure caused by credit rationing. If so, the 
program is more likely to generate a net social benefit than if the market failure results from 
the inability of lenders to recover ex ante assessment costs from higher-risk borrowers. 
However, even assuming the existence of credit rationing, the SBFP is generating a net 
social loss. A key reason for this outcome is that about 45 per cent of loans supported by 
the program would have been approved by lenders without a guarantee. The program’s 
objectives are to improve access to loans for small business by guaranteeing loans that 
would otherwise be rejected by lenders or that would have been approved with a higher 
interest rate or less-favourable conditions. Guaranteeing conditionally approved loans 
harms economic efficiency in much the same way as guaranteeing unconditionally 
approved loans. 
The decision to participate in the loan-guarantee program is made by the borrower and 
lender; SBFP administrators play no direct role in the decision. SBFP administrators 
can, however, influence the incrementality of the program through ex post assessments 
of participants. Nevertheless, greater efforts to focus program participation on loans that 
would have been rejected outright should be made. A useful starting point would be to rule 
out participation if the loan would have been conditionally approved. SBFP administrators 
should also undertake some monitoring of lenders, such as a random assessment of 
participants, to increase incrementality. 
58 Canada. Department of Innovation, Science and Economic Development, “Canada Small Business Financing Act 
Comprehensive Review Report (2009–2014),” 2015, https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/csbfp-pfpec.nsf/eng/h_la03256.html.
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The Business Development Bank’s Financing Program
The Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) has five business lines, all of which 
serve small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The BDC has recorded a profit every 
year since 2001, but this is based on an unrealistically low cost of capital. Calculated using 
a 6.25-per-cent real social opportunity cost of capital (Box 5), the BDC has recorded a loss 
in every year since 2002.
The BDC’s largest business line is the Financing Program, with a loan portfolio of $19.7 
billion in fiscal 2016. The BDC’s mandate is to provide services complementary to those 
offered by commercial banks.59 The BDC reports that the Financing Program provides 
loans to SMEs with a higher average risk profile than those offered by commercial banks, 
although an explicit comparison is not provided. The allowance fell from 2011 to 2015, 
reaching about half of the average of the five years ending in 2011. The allowance for 
credit losses edged up to 3.0 per cent of the loan portfolio in 2016. The Financing Program 
portfolio is substantially less risky than the SBFP portfolio, where defaults averaged 9.65 
per cent of loan values from 2000 to 2009. 
An illustrative cost-benefit analysis of the BDC Financing Program is presented in Table 5.  
The social benefit is calculated using the same methodology and some of the same 
parameters as for the SBFP. 
The implicit assumption in the illustrative cost-benefit analysis is that the BDC is correcting 
a capital market failure that causes credit rationing, which prevents higher-risk borrowers 
from obtaining credit. The rate of return on projects financed by these loans is expected to 
be higher than for projects financed by conventional bank loans, even after default costs. 
The difference in the rates of return is approximated by the subsidy BDC financing is able 
to offer because its cost of capital is lower than commercial banks. There are three elements 
to the subsidy calculation.
• Following Bergevin and Poschmann,60 the BDC’s debt is assumed to be financed at 
the same rate as subordinated debentures issued by commercial banks instead of a 
government bond rate. The gap between these two measures widened greatly from 
about 50 to 75 basis points prior to the financial crisis, but recent issues suggest that it 
has since narrowed to about 150 basis points. The average rate on 10-year government 
bonds issued in fiscal 2016 was 1.5 per cent, which would put the rate on subordinated 
bank debentures at 3.0 per cent. The effective rate of interest paid by the BDC 
Financing Program on funds borrowed from the federal government was 0.8 per cent 
in 2016. The higher cost of capital would have reduced the $536-million profit of the 
BDC Financing Program in 2016 to $27 million. 
• Again following Bergevin and Poschmann, it is assumed that commercial banks 
typically have a 15-per-cent rate of return on equity. The extra income required to reach 
this target return in 2016, given the adjusted net income calculated above and a prorated 
share (89 per cent) of the BDC’s $5.3 billion in equity, would be approximately $685 
million (0.15 x 0.89 x $5324 million – $27 million = $686.9 million). 
59 Canada. Business Development Bank of Canada Act (1995), http://lois-laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/B-9.9/FullText.html.
60 Philippe Bergevin and Finn Poschmann, “Reining in the Risks: Rethinking the Role of Crown Financial Corporations in 
Canada,” C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 372 (2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2286869.
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• The last step is an adjustment for corporate income taxes that are paid by commercial 
banks but not by the BDC. In 2016, the combined federal-provincial corporate income 
tax rate was 26.7 per cent, so the total additional cost arising from treating the BDC 
like a commercial bank would have been about $950 million in fiscal 2016. 
Box 5: Does the Business Development Bank make a profit?
The Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) is a government business enterprise with a mandate to support 
entrepreneurship by providing financial and management services, particularly to small and medium-sized 
enterprises.1 The bank’s activities are expected to be complementary to commercial financial institutions. The BDC’s 
capital is provided by the federal government in the form of equity investment — limited to $3 billion — and loans, 
which are limited by a cap on the debt-equity ratio and a capital-adequacy ratio. The bank’s debt and contingent 
liabilities cannot exceed 12 times its equity. In the last 15 years, the BDC’s total capital has risen from $943 million to 
$22,271 million. Most of the increase has taken place since 2007, when federal investment was $1,808 million.
The BDC has reported positive net income every year since 2000. In the 2016 fiscal year, which ended March 31, 
2016, the BDC reported net income of $535.5 million (Table 2). Reported net income is, however, not the best 
measure of the cost of resources allocated to BDC. The main consideration is the corporation’s cost of capital. In 
2016, the BDC had outstanding loans of $16.9 billion with the federal government and paid $76.2 million in interest, 
which implies an effective interest rate of 0.8 per cent. Excluding retained earnings, the federal government’s 
equity stake in the BDC was $2.1 billion in 2016. If the government’s total investment is assumed to be financed 
by additional borrowing (and the interest on this borrowing is financed by higher taxes), the BDC’s cost of capital 
in 2016 would have been about $370 million. This estimate assumes that the entire amount was financed by bond 
issues in 2016, when the interest rate on new issues of 10-year bonds was 1.5 per cent. With this estimate of the cost 
of capital, the BDC’s net income in 2016 would be about $170 million.
A cogent argument can be made that using the government’s cost of borrowing still understates the BDC’s cost of 
capital. Funds borrowed by the federal government and given to the BDC could have been deployed elsewhere in 
the economy. Jenkins and Kuo2 recommend using an eight-per-cent real rate of return for this economic opportunity 
cost of capital in Canada. However, since this estimate was prepared, views on the cost of capital have shifted lower. 
For example, the Bank of Canada3 now assumes the neutral real interest rate is in the range of 1.0 to 1.75 per cent, 
down 1.75 percentage points from its level prior to the financial crisis. The Bank of Canada cites a population-induced 
slowdown in the potential growth rate of the Canadian economy and a substantial imbalance between global saving 
and investment as key reasons for the decline in the neutral interest rate.
Assuming that the real economic opportunity cost of capital has also fallen 1.75 percentage points to 6.25 per cent, 
and assuming a two-per-cent inflation rate, the BDC’s cost of capital would be about $1.8 billion in 2016, which would 
leave the BDC with a deficit of approximately $1.2 billion. Using this measure of the cost of capital, the BDC has 
recorded a loss in every year since 2002.
1. Canada. Business Development Bank of Canada Act (1995),  
http://lois-laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/B-9.9/FullText.html.
2. Glenn Jenkins and Chun-Yan Kuo, “The Economic Opportunity Cost of Capital for Canada—An Empirical 
Update” Queen’s Economics Department Working Paper no. 1133 (2007),  
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.489.3929&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
3. Stephen S. Poloz "Living with Lower for Longer" 20 September 2016.  
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/2016/09/living-lower-longer/
The potential additional costs are equivalent to a subsidy received by the BDC that can 
be passed on to borrowers. With $19.7 billion in loans outstanding in 2016, the subsidy 
would have allowed BDC to reduce interest rates on loans by 4.8 percentage points. By 
assumption, this reduction is equal to the increase in the expected rate of return on BDC-
financed projects relative to projects financed by commercial bank loans. Applying the 
Harberger Triangle calculation and assuming a 0.56 incrementality ratio for BDC loans 
used in the SBFP analysis, the social benefit of correcting the assumed market failure is 
almost $300 million.
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TABLE 5  ILLUSTRATIVE BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF THE BDC'S FINANCING PROGRAM  
(2015-16 IN MILLIONS OF $)
Social Benefits
Mitigate capital market failure 295.7
Social Costs
Opportunity cost of capital -1642.2
Reported net income 441.8
Interest paid to federal government 66.9
Net social benefit -837.8
Percentage of loan portfolio -4.6%
The social cost of the Financing Program is the opportunity cost of the capital invested less 
net income earned on financing operations. As indicated above, almost 90 per cent of the 
BDC’s capital (debt plus equity) is attributable to the Financing Program, which amounts 
to about $19.9 billion. Assuming an 8.25-per-cent economic opportunity cost of capital 
(Box 5), the Financing Program’s cost of capital would be about $1.6 billion. Recorded net 
income less interest payments to the federal government represents the part of the cost of 
capital paid by borrowers, so it has to be deducted from the opportunity-cost measure. The 
net social cost of the program was about $850 million in 2016. 
The estimated net cost is not particularly sensitive to the incrementality assumption. If all 
BDC loans are incremental (that is, if no BDC borrowers could have obtained financing 
from a commercial bank), the net social cost would have been $600 million. There is no 
information available to help assess whether the incrementality ratio used, 0.56, is too high 
or too low. On the other hand, the Financing Program would have a net social cost of zero if 
the opportunity cost of its capital were about four per cent.
Policy recommendation
The net social cost of the Financing Program is about 4.5 cents per dollar of loan issued, 
compared to about 1.3 cents for the SBFP. This comparison suggests that the social cost of 
the Financing Program could be dramatically reduced if BDC operated a loan-guarantee 
program instead of a direct-lending program. This finding is consistent with theoretical 
analysis that suggests governments should focus on guarantee programs instead of direct 
lending. They could be combined into one program that, if appropriately structured to raise 
incrementality, would be likely to provide a small net social benefit. 
BDC subordinate financing 
The subordinate financing program targets high-potential firms that need financing to 
sustain growth or need to transition from one owner to the next.61 The program makes debt 
and some equity-like investments that have subordinate status relative to other debt issued 
by firms receiving financing, making these investments riskier than loans made under the 
Financing Program. Less information is available on the risk profile of subordinated loans 
than on the term loans of the Financing Program, but there is a substantial difference in the 
61 Business Development Bank of Canada, “Annual Report 2015” (2015), 24, https://www.bdc.ca/en/documents/annualreport/
BDC_AnnualReport_2015.pdf.
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required capital-adequacy ratios: 10 per cent for the Financing Program and 25 per cent for 
subordinated financing. The additional risk is reflected in relative interest income as well. 
In 2016, interest income represented 8.3 per cent of the subordinate financing portfolio, 
compared to 5.2 per cent for the Financing Program portfolio. 
All of the financing activity takes place via joint ventures with the Caisse de dépôt et 
placement du Québec. The BDC acts as a general partner, handling all lending and 
managerial activities in exchange for fees.62 In 2016, the value of the subordinated-financing 
program investments was $751 million. Although information on the geographic and 
sectoral distributions of investments is provided in annual reports, information about 
investment stage (seed, startup, etc.) is not provided.
TABLE 6  ILLUSTRATIVE BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF THE BDC'S SUBORDINATE FINANCING PROGRAM  
(2015-16 IN MILLIONS OF $)
Social Benefits
Mitigate capital market failure 0.7
Social Costs
Opportunity cost of capital -62.6
Reported net income 53.7
Interest paid to federal government 4.6
Net social benefit -3.6
Percentage of loan portfolio -0.5%
Applying the cost-benefit framework used for the Financing Program to the subordinated 
financing program suggests that social costs exceed benefits by a small margin (Table 6):  
the net cost represents under one per cent of the investment portfolio compared to 4.5 per 
cent for the Financing Program. The key reason for this more favourable outcome is strong 
net income results. In fiscal 2016, net income from subordinated financing was $53.7 million, 
or approximately seven per cent of the value of the portfolio. The comparable figure for 
the Financing Program was two per cent. An important consideration is that fees received 
from the Caisse de dépôt et placement and others cover almost all operating expenses. The 
BDC draws attention to unusually low investment losses in recent years,63 and projects a 
much lower level of net income for 2017 as losses return to levels more consistent with the 
riskiness of the portfolio. If net income had been the same share of the investment portfolio 
as for the Financing Program, subordinated financing would have incurred a net social 
cost equal to about 4.5 per cent of the investment portfolio. Note that an implication of 
the relatively high profitability is that a relatively small subsidy is provided to clients: 0.2 
percentage points compared to 5.4 per cent for the Financing Program.
The cost-benefit analysis does not capture two important elements of the subordinate 
financing program. As explained in the “Rationales” section, the program will be of 
particular interest to entrepreneurs with projects that are too risky for conventional debt 
finance but who do not, even if successful, offer a high enough return to attract venture 
capital. Getting these borrowers into the appropriate financing niche could be welfare-
enhancing. On the other hand, the program will also be attractive to entrepreneurs with 
62 Business Development Bank of Canada, “Annual Report 2004” (2004), 30.
63 Business Development Bank of Canada, “Annual Report 2016” (2016), 34, https://www.bdc.ca/EN/Documents/
annualreport/BDC_AR2016_EN_Final.pdf.
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projects too risky for conventional projects for which they believe, rightly or wrongly, that 
advice from venture capitalists will not increase the probability of success sufficiently 
to cover the extra cost of venture capital financing. If these entrepreneurs are correct in 
their assessment, obtaining financing could be welfare-enhancing; but if they are not, 
obtaining subordinated financing could impose a social cost in the form of wasted resources 
in a failed project. The impact of these additional elements on the net social cost of the 
subordinate financing program cannot be predicted. 
Policy recommendation
The subordinate financing program may be filling a gap in the supply of risk capital 
by providing financing for projects too risky for conventional debt but not suitable for 
venture capital financing. Not enough detail on the program is publicly available to be 
highly confident about recommending some fine-tuning to improve performance. It 
would be worth investigating, however, if more resources should be allocated to screening 
and advising loan applicants. It is also questionable to have the BDC take the lead in its 
partnership with the Caisse de dépôt. The possibility of providing side-car funding should 
be investigated.
BDC venture capital 
The BDC makes venture capital investments directly at every stage of a technology-based 
company’s development and makes indirect investments via funds, some of which are led 
by private and other public sector funds. The BDC is a significant player in the risk capital 
market. In fiscal years 2015 and 2016, new investments, including the Venture Capital 
Action Plan (VCAP), amounted to $236 million and $318 million, which was about 11 per 
cent of the value of all new risk capital investments reported by the Canadian Venture 
Capital Association. As VCAP funding is fully deployed, the BDC will become a more 
important participant in the risk capital market.
The total value of the venture capital portfolio in 2016, excluding $138 million invested 
separately under the VCAP, was $928 million. In 2016, the venture capital portfolio was split 
roughly 60-40 in favour of direct investments, down from 85-15 in 2010. There was $360 
million in authorized but undisbursed financing in 2016, most of which will be allocated 
to indirect investments. VCAP funding, which has a potential size of $400 million, is 
placed with larger funds focused on later-stage financing. Like most other participants, 
BDC Venture Capital was unprofitable for much of the 2000s. Capital gains on the BDC’s 
investment portfolio (realized and accrued) were negative from 2002 to 2010. BDC Venture 
Capital recorded a profit in 2015, the first since 2001, and a larger profit in 2016. Capital 
gains on the portfolio were positive for four out of the five years ending in 2016. 
A 2011 review of the industry and the BDC’s role in it concluded that the Canadian venture 
capital industry was “broken.”64 The venture capital market shrank dramatically after the 
“dot-com” boom and fell further by 2010 as negative returns prompted private investors 
to exit the industry. According to the BDC, substantial changes would be required to draw 
64 Business Development Bank of Canada, “Venture Capital Industry Review.”
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them back.65 The review drew attention to the small scale of Canadian funds and the lesser 
skill of fund managers compared to their U.S. counterparts as key reasons for industry 
underperformance. It also noted that substantial investments were made by government and 
retail funds that have objectives and constraints that may hurt returns.
The 2011 report announced a new strategic direction, the most important element of which 
was the intention to use BDC resources to promote the emergence of “at-scale” funds 
managed by skilled personnel, emphasizing indirect rather than direct investment. This 
approach implies an increasingly passive and smaller role for the BDC as private sector 
managers become more skilled. 
Assessing the net social benefit of the venture capital program is even more difficult 
than for the other financing programs considered so far. One issue is that it is hard to 
specify the benefit of supplying additional funding to the seed capital market. There are 
sound reasons to suppose that the seed and startup segments of the risk capital market 
are undersupplied, so it would be possible, in principle, to determine the additional 
return earned on funds shifted into these market segments. However, the BDC no longer 
publishes the rate of return on its VC portfolio and the Canadian Venture Capital and 
Private Equity Association has also suspended publication of its rate-of-return data while 
it assesses its methodology. In addition, there is no recent publicly available information on 
investments by stage of development.66 
A second issue is that the benefits of the new strategic orientation would be difficult to assess 
at the best of times and are impossible to assess after the relatively short period that it has 
been underway. Further, while improving the quality of managers and increasing the size of 
the funds they work with would be beneficial, there could be substantial transition costs. The 
nature of the market failure in the venture capital segment does not suggest that the amount 
of venture capital available is too low, so the additional public supply will displace or crowd 
out some private investors. Downward pressure on rates of return appears to be inevitable in 
the short run, but they will recover as weaker participants leave the industry. 
Policy recommendations
Although it was not possible to perform a cost-benefit analysis of BDC Venture Capital, 
some policy recommendations based on the analytical framework developed above can 
be made. First, the BDC should shift from direct seed capital investments to passive or 
side-car investments with angel investors. In this approach, the government would offer 
private investors leveraged returns by capping its return while leaving its entire investment 
at risk. The cap would be set so that the expected private return would rise by an amount 
equal to the estimated premium required by risk-averse entrepreneurs. The risk premium is 
unknown, as is the proportion of the subsidy that will be passed on to entrepreneurs, so the 
BDC should experiment with relatively small subsidies — for example, three to seven per 
cent of the investment — to gain some understanding of the market. 
65 ibid.
66 In 2012, the last year the data were published, direct investments were allocated as follows: seed capital, 16 per cent; startup 
capital, 21 per cent; development capital, 50 per cent; and expansion capital, 13 per cent. Startups are defined as firms with 
fewer than 12 consecutive months of sales.
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In its 2011 review, the BDC made the point that the angel network is not well developed 
in Canada. While the theoretical expectation is that risk-neutral investors would find 
all profitable investment opportunities, there could be a shortage of investors with 
enough industry knowledge to provide useful advice. If this is still a limitation, the BDC 
could continue to make direct investments at the same time as side-car investments. A 
comparison of rates of return obtained in the two approaches would provide a useful test of 
the hypothesis that there is a shortage of skilled angel investors.
Second, activity in the venture capital segment should be confined to indirect investment, 
with the private sector taking the lead in most circumstances. The only tenable rationale for 
direct investment in venture capital by a public enterprise is to mitigate the moral-hazard 
problem by providing more advice than would be forthcoming from private investors. 
But this can be achieved at a lower cost by investing passively in private sector funds and 
offering leveraged returns to its partners. 
Third, the BDC should increase the supply of venture capital cautiously when implementing 
its strategy to restructure the venture capital industry. Considerable judgment will be 
required to get the right balance between short-run costs and long-run benefits of the 
strategy. The BDC should also be prepared to decrease its presence in the industry as its 
strategic goals are achieved. A competitive rate of return in the venture capital industry 
would be a sign of successful intervention. 
There is an ongoing need to address the issue of correcting the incentive for private 
investors to provide the socially optimum amount of advice to firms they support. 
Continued presence by the BDC in the form of passive investment with leveraged returns 
for its partners is one solution. In this case, the BDC would attempt to participate in all 
private sector funds, choosing a level of investment and caps that provide an incentive 
large enough to alter private sector behaviour. The social benefits of mitigating this market 
failure are difficult to assess, so the BDC should proceed cautiously. A prudent starting 
point would be to provide a subsidy that raises the expected value of private sector returns 
by two to four percentage points. 
There is not enough information in the public domain to permit recommendations on how 
the BDC should allocate its resources between seed/startup and venture capital investments. 
The best way to make a decision is to keep an eye on ex post rates of return. In a healthy 
market, they should be approximately the same in both segments and higher than in public 
markets to account for the higher risk. 
BDC consulting services
The BDC provides a broad range of advisory services to entrepreneurs at subsidized rates. 
The percentage of costs recovered through fees has been on a downward trend since 2010; 
in 2016, the cost-recovery rate was 34.7 per cent, a bit more than 40 per cent of its value in 
2010. A further decline is expected for fiscal 2017.
Providing consulting services at below-cost rates is, in principle, a sound policy. As 
discussed in the “Rationales” section, providing technical advice could enhance welfare 
by convincing entrepreneurs to abandon low-quality projects, thereby avoiding wasting 
resources. Subsidized technical advice could also improve welfare by raising the probability 
of success of projects rejected by venture capitalists as “low-return” but which are too 
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risky for debt financing or pure equity financing (i.e., financing provided without advice). 
These benefits would arise from assisting entrepreneurs applying for subordinate financing 
or venture capital financing and a small slice of Financing Program clients. There is a 
plausible case for providing subsidized business-management advice to potentially high-
impact entrepreneurs. Such entrepreneurs may fail in the absence of business advice, so 
such a service can be seen as indirectly subsidizing knowledge creation. The case for 
providing subsidized business-management advice to all startups to address an externality 
is much less compelling. 
4.2 Support for R&D
The two largest federal programs that support R&D undertaken by SMEs are the enhanced 
Scientific Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) Investment Tax Credit and 
the Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP), a spending program administered by 
the National Research Council. 
The Enhanced SR&ED Investment Tax Credit
SMEs can claim a 35-per-cent refundable tax credit on up to $3 million in qualifying 
R&D. The $3-million “expenditure limit” is reduced to zero as taxable income rises from 
$500,000 to $800,000, or as business assets rise from $10 to $50 million. R&D spending 
in excess of the expenditure limit is eligible for a 15-per-cent tax credit that is 40-per-cent 
refundable until the firm exceeds either the taxable income or asset threshold. Prior to 
2014, the regular credit rate was 20 per cent. Since the regular tax credit cannot always be 
claimed as it is earned, its present value is lower than 15 per cent. The pattern of regular 
SR&ED claims in the early 2000s reduced the present value of the regular credit by about 
15 per cent, or 2.25 percentage points.67 
The fiscal cost of the enhanced SR&ED tax credit in 2015 was $1.3 billion. The cost of the 
additional support provided — the difference between the 35-per-cent and 15-per-cent tax 
credit — was $725 million. Lester68 finds that the enhanced credit results in a net social 
cost of about 12 cents per dollar of tax revenue forgone, which would put the annual social 
cost at $155 million in 2015. In contrast, the regular credit generates a net benefit of about 
12 cents per dollar of tax revenue forgone. The higher subsidy rate and higher compliance 
costs per dollar of credit received for smaller firms explain the different outcomes. The 
loss is even more substantial if provincial tax credits are included. The federal-provincial 
weighted average SR&ED statutory tax credit for SMEs is about 42 per cent (Table 7), 
which implies a social cost of about $205 million for federal and provincial programs in 
2015. The optimal statutory subsidy rate — the rate that minimizes the loss — for smaller 
firms is about 23 per cent.69 The social loss at this rate would be about $120 million. The 
optimal statutory subsidy rate for large firms is approximately the same.70 
67 
Canada. Expert Panel Review of Federal Support to Research and Development, “Assessing the Scientific Research and 
Experimental Development Tax Credit” (2011), http://rd-review.ca/eic/site/033.nsf/eng/h_00326.html.
68 
John Lester, “Benefit-Cost Analysis of R&D Support Programs,” Canadian Tax Journal 60, 4 (2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2215681.
69 About 92 per cent of R&D spending is eligible for the enhanced credit, so the optimal effective subsidy rate is about 20 per cent. 
70 
This estimate does not include an adjustment for the decline in the effective rate caused by non-refundability of the regular 
credit. 
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The optimal subsidy rates were calculated assuming that knowledge spillovers and the 
responsiveness of spending to a subsidy are the same for both categories of firm. As 
discussed in Section 2, theoretical and empirical analyses does not provide much guidance 
on the relative size of spillovers. The safest conclusion would be that spillovers are the same 
for large and small firms. The empirical work on the price sensitivity of R&D spending 
by size of firm is not extensive, but provides limited support for the view that spending 
by small firms is more sensitive to price changes than spending by larger firms.71 Based 
on the model used in Lester,72 if spending by small firms were 25-per-cent more sensitive 
to the price of R&D than larger firms, which would be a large difference, the optimal 
subsidy rate would rise by about 3.5 percentage points to about 25 per cent. Given the other 
uncertainties associated with calculating the optimal rate, there is no compelling reason to 
adopt a higher optimal rate for small firms.
TABLE 7  FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL SR&ED INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT RATES 
(2016, %)
Statutory Rates Optimal Rates
Federal Provincial Combined1 Combined
Enhanced credit 35.0 11.1 42.2 22.0
Regular credit 15.0 5.3 19.5 23.0
Recommended Federal Rates
Federal Provincial2 Combined1
Enhanced credit 15.0 11.1 24.4
Regular credit 15.0 5.3 19.5
1. The base for the federal credit is reduced by the amount of provincial assistance provided.
2. Actual rates.
Policy recommendations
Taken at face value, the cost-benefit analysis suggests that the federal enhanced investment 
tax credit should be eliminated. However, the static cost-benefit framework provides an 
imprecise measure of the net social benefits. Benefits could be understated because the 
impacts on consumer surplus are not adequately captured, or they could be overstated 
because the estimated spillover benefits do not include the destruction of rents caused by 
innovations. In a dynamic setting, however, benefits are more likely to be understated 
because some innovations may have large and long-lasting impacts on living standards. It 
is not possible to quantify these benefits, but their possible existence is a strong argument 
against eliminating the enhanced credit. Maintaining the enhanced credit could also be 
justified as a second-best policy to offset the net negative impact of the set of externalities, 
market failures and policy-induced barriers faced by innovative startups. 
A more prudent policy approach than eliminating the enhanced credit would be to reduce 
the static loss by setting the federal rate such that the combined federal-provincial rate is 
close to its optimal value of 22 per cent. At current provincial rates, this would be achieved 
by setting the federal rate at 12.5 per cent. To obtain a 23-per-cent combined rate for the 
regular credit, the federal rate should be set at 19 per cent. A less controversial option would 
71 
Lester, “Benefit-Cost Analysis.”
72 ibid.
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be to set the federal enhanced credit rate at 15 per cent, the same as the current regular 
credit rate. This would put the combined federal-provincial enhanced credit slightly above 
its optimal rate and the combined regular credit about three percentage points below its 
optimal rate (Table 7). 
In order to ensure that the combined rate does not substantially exceed the optimal rate, the 
federal government should also announce its intention to adjust its rate if provincial rates 
change. One possibility would be to periodically adjust the federal rate to offset changes in 
the weighted average provincial rate. 
As explained in Lester and Warda,73 there is a particularly strong case for refundability for 
young firms, which are unlikely to have taxable income while their first round of R&D is 
underway. In addition, even a 15-per-cent subsidy results in a negative effective tax rate on 
R&D so commercialization of R&D undertaken by an undiversified firm will not generate 
sufficient income to make use of the subsidy as it is earned. The absence of refundability 
therefore puts young and undiversified firms at a disadvantage relative to established, 
diversified firms. Note that with refundability, setting the two federal rates at the same 
value would not result in any administrative savings because criteria for refundability 
would have to be maintained. 
The Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP)
IRAP provides assistance to corporations operating in Canada with up to 500 full-time-
equivalent employees, but most awards are made to firms with fewer than 50 employees. 
The value of awards to firms in fiscal 2016 was $168 million. In addition to direct financial 
assistance, firms also receive technical and business advice by industrial technology 
advisers (ITAs). In 2007, the last year for which the data are publicly available, advice 
amounted to almost a third of direct financial assistance.74 If this ratio still applied in fiscal 
2016, the total benefit received by firms would have been $222 million.
The financial assistance to firms is provided as contribution funding, which increases 
administration and compliance costs of the program. Direct assistance to firms can be 
provided as a grant, a contribution, or a loan. In contrast to the awarding of grants or 
claiming a tax credit, firms receiving contribution assistance are required to submit 
progress reports and a final accounting of the use of funds; they may also be audited to 
verify the accuracy of submitted reports. Further upward pressure on IRAP administration 
expenses arises from a rigorous assessment of applicants by ITAs to ensure that applicants 
73 John Lester and Jacek Warda, “An International Comparison of Tax Assistance for Research and Development:  
Estimates and Policy Implications,” University of Calgary School of Public Policy Research Paper 7, 36 (November 2014),  
http://www.policyschool.ca/publications/international-comparison-assistance-research-and-development/.
74 National Research Council, “Impact Evaluation of the NRC Industrial Research Assistance Program—Final Report” 
(2007), online document dated 2007 available on request from NRC-IRAP.\\uc0\\u8221{} 2007, online document dated 
2007 available on request from NRC-IRAP.}”,”plainCitation”:”National Research Council, “Impact Evaluation of the 
NRC Industrial Research Assistance Program—Final Report,” 2007, online document dated 2007 available on request 
from NRC-IRAP.”},”citationItems”:[{“id”:1292,”uris”:[“http://zotero.org/users/2713875/items/DEDJMZS4”],”uri”:[“http://
zotero.org/users/2713875/items/DEDJMZS4”],”itemData”:{“id”:1292,”type”:”article”,”title”:”Impact Evaluation of the NRC 
Industrial Research Assistance Program—Final Report”,”URL”:”online document dated 2007 available on request from 
NRC-IRAP”,”author”:[{“family”:”National Research Council”,”given”:””}],”issued”:{“date-parts”:[[“2007”]]}}}],”schema”:”
https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”} 
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are “investment ready” and that their projects are worthy of funding. Many are not: only 
about a third of IRAP clients are receiving financial assistance at any given time.75, 76
As a result of these characteristics, administration and compliance costs represent a 
substantial fraction of IRAP funding. The most recent publicly available information 
indicates that prior to 2009, IRAP administration costs — excluding the cost of advice 
provided — amounted to almost 25 cents per dollar of payments to firms. Compliance 
costs are also relatively high at about 11.5 cents per dollar of funding-assistance received. 
The sum of compliance and adjusted administration costs is about 33 per cent of benefits 
received, compared to about 17 per cent for the enhanced SR&ED credit.77
IRAP clients received a direct subsidy of about 20 per cent of their project costs on average 
in 2009. (The subsidy rate on eligible costs was much higher.) The cost of advice received 
raised the overall subsidy rate to just under 24 per cent. This subsidy is in addition to 
any benefits received through federal and provincial tax credits. One of the criteria for 
obtaining financial assistance through IRAP is that a firm must have a plan to develop 
and commercialize “innovative, technology-driven new or improved products, services, 
or processes.” It is therefore highly likely that all IRAP clients will be eligible for the 
enhanced SR&ED tax credit. In the cost-benefit analysis discussed below, it is assumed that 
all IRAP clients perform R&D and claim the enhanced SR&ED credit.
Lester78 reports that the costs of providing assistance through IRAP exceeded the benefits 
in the 2009 version of the program (Table 8). The static net cost of the program is likely 
understated since the study made three assumptions favourable to finding a positive net 
benefit. 
• First, as discussed above, it was assumed that technological advice provided by 
ITAs is equivalent to R&D spending by the recipient firm and therefore generates 
spillovers. The spillover benefit is overstated, however, because ITAs provide 
business-management advice as well as technological advice to clients and it was not 
possible to separate the two. 
• Second, it was assumed that the rigorous screening process undertaken by ITAs 
results in more projects receiving assistance in the “applied research” stage than the 
“experimental development” stage, where the spillovers are considerably smaller. 
Spillovers from IRAP-financed projects are assumed to be 76 per cent compared to 56 
per cent on average for all R&D projects.
• Third, IRAP was analyzed as a stand-alone program instead of an add-on to the 
federal and provincial SR&ED tax credits. 
75 
ibid.”URL”:”online document dated 2007 available on request from NRC-IRAP”,”author”:[{“family”:”National Research 
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Receiving IRAP funding technically reduces the federal enhanced SR&ED tax credit, but 
the effective impact is to reduce the marginal value of the IRAP subsidy. This reduction 
lowers the amount of additional R&D stimulated and hence the value of spillovers.79 On 
the other hand, the lower fiscal cost of the SR&ED credit reduces the cost of financing 
the credit, and this social saving should also be attributed to IRAP.80 As a result of these 
changes, the net social cost of IRAP rises from about eight per cent to 14 per cent of 
program costs (Table 8).
TABLE 8  BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF THE ENHANCED SR&ED CREDIT AND IRAP 
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS, EXCEPT AS NOTED)
SR&ED  
Enhanced Credit1
IRAP2
Stand-alone SR&ED Add-on
Amount of support received by firms3 1145 187 187
Effective Subsity Rate 32.3% 23.9% 15.5%
Additional R&D induced by the support 855 145 98
Spillover rate (% of induced R&D) 56% 76.0% 76.0%
Benefits
Spillover Benefit to Society 467 110 74
Costs of Providing Assistance
Financing Cost 286 54 39
Resource Reallocation Effect 194 39 32
Administration Expenses4 19 27 27
Compliance Costs4 107 8 8
Net Benefit -140 -18 -32
As a % of program spending5 -12.2% -7.9% -13.9%
1. Scientific Research and Experimental Development Investment Tax Credit, 2007 data with Budget 2012 program 
parameters.
2. Industrial Research Assistance Program, 2009 program parameters, with Budget 2012 funding. IRAP clients typically 
also claim the SR&ED credit. This relationship is ignored in the 'stand-alone' scenario.
3. IRAP estimate includes technical and management advice provided.
4. Fixed expenses only; variable expenses are captured in the spillover benefit and the resource reallocation effect.
5. Program spending includes administration expenses.
Policy recommendations
The cost-benefit analysis, although based on the 2009 version of the program, highlights the 
need to reduce the cost of administering IRAP.81 The contrast with the enhanced SR&ED 
tax credit, which costs about 2.5 per cent of program expenses to administer, is striking. 
Part of the explanation for the difference is economies of scale: the SR&ED tax credit is 
received by almost 10 times as many firms. But as noted above, monitoring requirements 
are much more demanding for contribution funding than for either grants or tax-based 
measures. Requiring all clients to submit progress and final reports and having ITAs 
review them is too resource-intensive. It would seem reasonable to apply to direct-spending 
79 
The effective IRAP subsidy rate is (1 – 0.35) x 0.239 = 0.155, where 0.35 is the statutory rate for the federal SR&ED tax 
credit and 0.239 is the average IRAP subsidy rate. 
80 The induced effect on the cost of the SR&ED tax credit is calculated as the value of IRAP subsidies multiplied by the 
difference between the nominal and effective IRAP subsidy rates. 
81 
IRAP provides an unknown amount of project-evaluation services to other departments and agencies that should not be 
included in the cost-benefit analysis of IRAP.
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programs the same risk-management practices used to monitor tax-based spending 
programs. This would involve establishing client characteristics that trigger in-depth 
reviews and randomly selecting clients for detailed assessment. If a risk-based assessment 
approach were able to reduce administration expenses by 40 per cent and compliance costs 
by half, social benefits and costs would be roughly balanced. 
On the other hand, the high subsidy rate resulting from stacking IRAP and SR&ED benefits 
is cause for concern. A firm receiving the average IRAP subsidy rate along with federal and 
provincial SR&ED tax credits would have 58 per cent of the cost of a project subsidized by 
the government. Such a high subsidy rate is likely to make moral-hazard problems more 
acute. Further, with such high subsidy rates, the assumption of substantially higher-than-
average spillover effects may not be realistic, in which case IRAP would show a net social 
loss of about 10 per cent of total program expenses, even if administration and compliance 
costs are reduced. These considerations suggest that it would be prudent to reduce the 
maximum IRAP subsidy rate, without necessarily lowering overall program funding.82 
If the SR&ED incentive remains at current levels, the maximum subsidy rate would have 
to be reduced by about nine percentage points in order to keep the overall subsidy rate 
on IRAP-financed projects under 50 per cent. That would put the IRAP average effective 
subsidy rate at about 10 per cent. With no change to SR&ED, serious consideration should 
be given to transforming IRAP into an advice-only program. As discussed in Section 
2 and again in the review of the BDC’s consulting services, providing technical advice 
to potentially high-impact entrepreneurs is sound policy and there is a plausible case for 
providing free or subsidized business-management advice to these firms. It is, however, 
more difficult to justify offering subsidies of around 60 per cent of project costs.
If the enhanced SR&ED credit rate were reduced to 15 per cent, resulting in a combined 
federal-provincial rate of around 25 per cent, the average effective IRAP subsidy rate would 
rise to about 20 per cent. The overall subsidy rate (federal and provincial SR&ED plus a 
nominal IRAP subsidy of 24 per cent) would fall to 45 per cent. Reducing the nominal IRAP 
subsidy rate to 18 per cent would keep the effective rate at 15.5 per cent and the overall 
subsidy rate would decline to 40 per cent. IRAP funding levels would not need to change.
4.3 Non-targeted tax measures supporting entrepreneurship
There are four federal tax measures that support entrepreneurship. Three of these — the 
lifetime capital gains exemption (LCGE), the deduction of allowable business investment 
losses (ABIL) and the rollover of investment in small-business shares — reduce the capital 
gains tax on entrepreneurial activity or investment in such activity. None of these measures 
is targeted at high-impact entrepreneurs, but they are of particular benefit to investors and 
entrepreneurs undertaking high-risk projects where the return is realized largely through 
capital gains. The fourth measure provides a more favourable tax treatment of labour 
income received in the form of stock options. While stock option benefits are not limited  
to the small-business sector, options on small-business shares are treated more favourably. 
82 
Simulations with the cost-benefit model indicate that the loss would be minimized at a higher subsidy rate. However, the 
model does not capture the impact on the behaviour of entrepreneurs of increasing the subsidy rate substantially above 50 
per cent. 
46
However, since the cost of the option is not a deductible expense, the net subsidy is positive 
only for small or unprofitable firms. Further, the net subsidy is a small fraction of the cost 
of the stock option. 
The lifetime capital gains exemption
Up to $800,000 in capital gains on the sale of qualifying shares in Canadian-controlled 
private corporations (CCPCs) is exempt from taxation over the taxpayer’s lifetime. There 
is no explicit size limit on the exemption, but most CCPCs have well under $10 million in 
assets. The shares must have been held for 24 months prior to the sale by the taxpayer or 
the taxpayer’s spouse or common-law partner. More than half of the assets of the business 
must have been used to earn active business income, which excludes income from property 
and income from personal-services corporations.83 Shareholders of a CCPC may choose 
to crystallize a capital gain if the firm goes public. The stated objectives of the measure is 
to “bolster risk taking and investment in small businesses, help small-business owners to 
accumulate funds for retirement and facilitate intergenerational transfers.”84 The amount of 
tax revenue forgone in 2015 was $775 million.
There is a solid case for exempting capital gains earned on the sale of assets used to 
generate active business income. An increase in the flow of net income generated by 
business assets — due to, for example, a product, process or managerial innovation — will 
increase the market price of the assets. The price increase will equal the present value 
of the rise in the income stream generated by the asset. If the assets are sold, the income 
stream will be taxed twice: once as a capital gain and a second time when it is distributed 
as dividends. Taxation of capital gains remains appropriate when they are obtained from 
trading activities and could be justified when assets are revalued due to interest-rate 
changes. Interest-rate induced revaluations do not give rise to double taxation because the 
income stream generated by the asset does not change. 
Exempting business shares from capital gains has the disadvantage of making it more 
difficult to protect the revenue base. For example, income that would normally be 
distributed as dividends could be relabelled as a tax-free capital gain by using retained 
earnings to buy outstanding shares. Restricting the benefit to small-business shares may 
reduce the importance of this problem, because in many cases there could be a capital 
gain on the sale of shares without the firm ever having paid a dividend. There is no data 
available to quantify this supposition, but it is worth noting that few small businesses are 
profitable. In 2009, about two-thirds of firms eligible to claim the small-business deduction 
did not do so because they did not have positive active business income.85 
83 A personal-services business exists when a person performing services for a corporation could reasonably be considered an 
employee of the corporation.
84 Finance Canada, Tax Expenditures: Notes, 42, http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2010/taxexp1004-eng.asp. 
85 The source is unpublished data from Dachis and Lester, “Small Business.”
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Restricting the LCGE to small-business shares and imposing a lifetime limit makes it 
particularly beneficial to entrepreneurs starting a high-risk business for which the return 
is largely in the form of capital gains. Outside equity investors can also benefit, but could 
be expected to reach the lifetime limit more quickly than entrepreneurs, who would not 
necessarily be involved in a series of startups. The LCGE would mitigate moral-hazard 
problems in risk capital financing. Since neither entrepreneurs nor venture capitalists 
receive the full return to their effort in a joint project, the amount of effort supplied will be 
too low; lower capital gains taxation increases the return to effort by both entrepreneurs 
and outside investors.
Restricting the LCGE to small-business shares has been criticized as creating a barrier to 
the growth of small firms.86 The return to effort and growth generally becomes smaller 
when the LCGE is exhausted. As mentioned earlier, there are offsetting benefits from 
growth that rise more than proportionately with firm size, so firms with aggressive growth 
plans are more likely to jump over the barrier. Firms with a target size not much above the 
point where the LCGE is exhausted are more likely to remain below the threshold. The tax 
benefit is substantial, so this negative impact could be significant.
The LCGE partially corrects a distortion by reducing the double taxation of capital gains 
on small-business shares. It also reduces the importance of the asymmetric treatment of 
capital gains and losses. It may not raise welfare, however, because the LCGE opens up 
the possibility of unintended revenue losses, as income that would otherwise be taxable is 
characterized as a tax-free capital gain. On the other hand, since it applies only to small-
business shares, the LCGE reduces the relative cost of capital for small firms relative to 
large firms. This “distortion” could be seen as an appropriate offset to the numerous other 
disadvantages suffered by small firms listed in Table 1. 
The optimal cap on the LCGE would be determined by assessing the unintended revenue 
losses arising from re-characterizing dividend income as tax-free capital gain. The social 
benefit of not taxing capital gains and the social cost of financing the associated revenue 
loss are a constant proportion of the intended revenue loss. If income re-characterization 
is also a constant fraction of the intended revenue loss, the efficiency case for a cap on the 
LCGE disappears since the net social benefit will increase as the cap rises. Since there is a 
natural limit on the use of share buy-backs via a rising debt-equity ratio, it is likely that the 
ratio of unintended to intended revenue losses will fall as the cap rises. On the other hand, 
equity considerations could motivate a cap.
Policy recommendations
The LCGE appears to represent a reasonable compromise between the efficiency gains 
arising from mitigating the double taxation of capital gains and protecting the revenue base. 
The LCGE would be more cost-effective if it were possible to restrict access to high-impact 
entrepreneurs, since this would raise the value of spillover benefits per dollar of tax revenue 
forgone. There is probably not any satisfactory way to target high-impact entrepreneurs, so 
no changes are recommended.
86 
Duanjie Chen and Jack M. Mintz, “Small Business Taxation: Revamping Incentives to Encourage Growth,” University 
of Calgary School of Public Policy Research Paper 4, 7 (2011), https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/
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Deduction for allowable business investment losses (ABIL)
In most circumstances, capital losses can only be deducted from capital gains. This 
policy prevents taxpayers from deducting capital losses as they occur while deferring 
taxes on unrealized capital gains. While justifiable as a measure to protect the tax base, 
the asymmetric treatment of capital gains and losses may be particularly burdensome for 
owners of young firms, who may be more likely to have capital losses without offsetting 
capital gains. 
The deduction for allowable investment business losses (ABIL) permits losses incurred on 
shares or debt issued by a small business to be deducted from ordinary income. If the ABIL 
exceeds other sources of income for the year, the excess may be converted to a non-capital 
loss that may be carried back three years and carried forward 10 years. In the 11th year, the 
non-capital loss becomes a net capital loss that can only be deducted from capital gains. 
The amount deductible is adjusted to ensure that the interaction with the LCGE does not 
enhance the value of the deduction.87
The amount of forgone personal income tax revenue in 2015 as a result of ABILs was $55 
million. This is surprisingly small given that almost half of firms fail in the first three years 
after startup.88 Part of the explanation is the requirement that losses be first applied against 
capital gains deductions (the LCGE multiplied by the capital-gains-inclusion rate) claimed 
in earlier years. Another reason is that the cost of converting an ABIL to a non-capital loss 
is not included in the tax-expenditure estimate. 
Policy recommendations
Taxpayers making use of an ABIL are not first required to deduct the loss against 
unrealized capital gains, so claimants can continue to benefit from a tax deferral. This 
selective measure can be justified as an offset to the other barriers faced by startups. 
Indeed, the measure could be fine-tuned to make it more beneficial to startups. First, the 
carry-forward of ABILs converted to non-capital losses should be increased over time to 
maintain a constant present value. Second, although ABILs can be transferred to a spouse 
or partner by transferring the underlying asset, allowing a direct transfer of the deduction 
would be simpler. Third, it is worth considering making capital losses on unincorporated 
business ventures eligible for the deduction.
A more general solution to the problem of asymmetric treatment of capital gains and losses 
should be considered. Allowing all capital losses to be deducted from ordinary income 
after they have been applied to realized and accrued capital gains (in order limit the 
benefit of a tax deferral) would raise efficiency. There would be an offsetting loss through 
higher compliance and administration costs — determining the value of unrealized capital 
gains could be relatively expensive. The net effect is unknown, but with the advances in 
computerized systems a net positive impact is possible. 
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Canada Revenue Agency, “Capital Gains Form T4037,” 2014, http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tg/t4037/t4037-e.html.
88 Ryan Macdonald, Firm Dynamics: The Death of New Canadian Firms: A Survival Analysis of the 2002 Cohort of Entrants 
to the Business Sector (Statistics Canada, Economic Analysis Division, 2012), http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-622-m/11-
622-m2012028-eng.pdf. Macdonald performs a survival analysis of the 2002 cohort. The three-year survival rate for that 
cohort is 55 per cent.
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Rollover of investments in small-business shares 
Tax on the capital gain realized from the disposition of small-business common shares 
can be deferred provided that the proceeds are reinvested in another small business. The 
shares must be issued by a CCPC with active business income and with less than $50 
million in assets, less than half of which may be real estate. Professional corporations and 
corporations involved in real estate are not eligible for the rollover.89 The stated objective of 
the measure is to improve access to capital for small-business corporations.90 The amount of 
tax revenue forgone in 2015 was $2 million. 
Policy recommendations
Fine-tuning the rollover provision would involve making all classes of small-business 
shares eligible for the rollover. Expanding coverage to investments in unincorporated 
businesses should also be considered.
Stock options
The employment benefit arising from granting a stock option is calculated as the difference 
between the cost to the employee and the fair market value at the time the stocks are 
acquired. Subject to certain conditions, employees may deduct one-half of the employment 
benefit from taxable income. The additional benefit for small business is deferral of tax on 
the employment benefit until the stocks are sold. To qualify for the deferral, the options 
have to be offered by a CCPC. 
The cost of providing employee stock options is not a deductible expense for corporations, 
so the net subsidy on employment expenses equals one-half the employee’s marginal 
rate less the corporate income tax rate. The federal corporate income tax rate for large 
corporations is 15 per cent, so if the recipient were taxed at the top federal rate of 33 per 
cent, the net subsidy would be 1.5 per cent of the cost of the stock option. The federal 
corporate income tax rate for a small firm qualifying for the small-business deduction is 
10.5 per cent, so the net subsidy is six per cent of the cost of the option at the top marginal 
rate and 3.5 per cent for employees in the second-highest tax bracket of 29 per cent.91 If 
the firm providing the option is non-taxable, the net subsidy will be higher because the 
corporate tax liability will be deferred. If the deferral period is five years and the discount 
rate is five per cent, the net subsidy rises from six per cent to 8.3 per cent of the cost of a 
stock option provided by a small non-taxable firm to employees in the top tax bracket. 
Some of this wage subsidy will be captured by firms. Further, stock options represent 
deferred compensation that is only payable if the firm is successful, so the tax preference 
could be seen as offsetting some of the policy-induced disadvantages faced by innovative 
startups. 
89 
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90 Finance Canada, Tax Expenditures: Notes, 44.
91 In 2016, the 33-per-cent tax bracket applied to taxable income above $200,000; the 29-per-cent bracket applied to taxable 
income in the $140,388-to-$200,000 range.
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In 2015, the reported tax revenue forgone for all employee stock-option deductions was 
$685 million.92 But as pointed out by Mintz and Venkatachalam,93 this estimate does not 
include the additional corporate income tax revenue arising from the non-deductibility of 
employee stock options. The above examples, and the more detailed calculations by Mintz 
and Venkatachalam, indicate that the net revenue forgone is likely to be very small.94 
Policy recommendation
As recommended by Mintz and Venkatachalam, full taxation of employee stock-option 
benefits combined with deductibility of the cost by corporations would improve tax 
neutrality with respect to forms of employee compensation. Maintaining the current system 
for young CCPCs — less than five or seven years old, for example — would preserve a 
small benefit for high-impact entrepreneurs.
92 Finance Canada, Report on Federal Tax Expenditures — Concepts, Estimates and Evaluations 2017, https://www.fin.gc.ca/
taxexp-depfisc/2017/taxexp17-eng.asp.
93 
Jack Mintz and Ven Balaji Venkatachalam, “Taxing Stock Options: Efficiency, Fairness and Revenue Implications,” 
University of Calgary School of Public Policy Research Paper 8,3 (2015), https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/
uploads/2016/03/taxing-stock-options-mintz-venkatachalam.pdf.
94 Mintz and Venkatachalam estimate that the net amount of tax revenue forgone is approximately zero, but their methodology 
does not accurately capture the impact of options offered by small firms. 
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ESTIMATING COSTS AND BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH EVIDENCE-BASED VIOLENCE PREVENTION: FOUR CASE STUDIES BASED ON THE FOURTH 
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WHO PAYS THE CORPORATE TAX? INSIGHTS FROM THE LITERATURE AND EVIDENCE FOR CANADIAN PROVINCES
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Corporate-Tax-McKenzie-Ferede1.pdf
Kenneth McKenzie and Ergete Ferede | April 2017
SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS- INCOME SUPPORT CASELOADS IN ALBERTA
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Social-Trends-Income-Support-for-April-Issue.pdf
Margarita Gres Wilkins | April 2017
NATIONAL PHARMACARE IN CANADA: 2019 OR BUST?
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